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ABSTRACT
The June 5, 1976, Teton Dam collapse occurred in a unique region of Idaho where
the population comprised as much as ninety-five percent of residents belonging to The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The homogenous nature of this population
influenced the nature of the recovery effort following the disaster. The Teton Dam
recovery effort provided an opportunity for the LDS church, using its welfare system and
priesthood (lay male leadership) organizational structure to seamlessly work with
government agencies. Church leaders used the reports of positive interactions between
its members and the federal and local leaders to celebrate an effective assimilation of its
principles into mainstream culture, even using distinctive aspects of Mormon culture and
practice to enhance the government’s recovery efforts. While the Teton Dam failure did
encourage a previously unprecedented level of cooperation between the federal or local
government and the LDS Church, this recovery effort also demonstrated an inability or
unwillingness of the church to actually abandon its unique beliefs and procedures.
The dam collapse allowed for a potential point of change in a larger narrative of
Mormon history noted by mutual antagonism between the church and government. This
change is a matter of perception by members of the church and their leadership during the
late 1970s. Much of the accommodation arose from the secular agencies that felt it easier
to adapt to the LDS recovery approach rather than implement their own methods of
organization. This environmental crisis provided an opportunity for the LDS Church in
1976 to display its beliefs and practices, which the federal government and mainstream

vi

American culture had historically found objectionable. The recovery period provided an
opportunity for the church to create a narrative based on its work following the collapse
of the dam that showed the value of priesthood leadership, welfare system, communal
spirit, and the doctrine of self-sufficiency.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The first Saturday of June, 1976, brought sunshine and warmth, drawing the
people of the Upper Snake River Valley outside to enjoy the spring weather. Ferron W.
Sonderegger, a resident of Sugar City, Idaho and a stake president in the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints of the Rexburg North Stake, spent the morning working in his
garden planting raspberries and strawberries. The little neighbor girls, Yvonne and Diane
Bean, ran to the Sonderegger house finding the stake president on his knees in the garden
and exclaimed, “Brother Sonderegger, the dam has broken. The Teton Dam has broken.”
In disbelief Sonderegger told the girls that he thought they were only joking, but agreed
to go next door where he heard a radio announcer implore his listeners to “Move out, the
dam has broken. Don’t stop for anything. Move out.”1
Workers completed much of the construction on the Teton Dam shortly before an
abnormally heavy spring thaw flooded into the new reservoir. They had yet to finish the
spillway or river works outlet, which allowed engineers to control how much water the
reservoir held. When workers fell slightly behind schedule on construction projects the
delay only compounded other, more fundamental dam problems. The dam site utilized
porous canyon walls riddled with large fissures that required a novel design approach.
The site also resided in an area prone to frequent seismic activity that could jeopardize
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Ferron W. Sonderegger, interviewed by Bruce Blumell, July 6, 1976, box 2, vol. 1, page
42, MSSI 2, Teton Dam Collection, Brigham Young University-Idaho Special
Collections, David O. McKay Library, Brigham Young University-Idaho, Rexburg,
Idaho.
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the integrity of the dam. Eastern Idahoans and the Bureau of Reclamation debated for
decades the necessity of a dam on the Teton River. This dam ultimately provided little
additional irrigation water and flood control to an area that did not routinely suffer from
severe flooding, making the necessity of taking such risks in the site and design a dubious
choice for such a minor reward. The questionable site, the Bureau’s inability to
adequately address the challenges of the canyon walls in their design, and record level
snowpack in 1975-76 came to a head on June 5 when the face of the dam suddenly
collapsed and unleashed its reservoir on several eastern Idaho towns and communities.
The ensuing flood took eleven lives, inundated over 180 square miles, destroyed
771 homes, damaged 3,002 additional homes, and killed 16,650 livestock.2 Flood
victims in Sugar City, Rexburg, Wilford, Salem, and Hibbard found themselves
homeless, possessing only the items that they quickly assembled before evacuating to
higher ground. For many this meant only the clothes they wore that day. Poor
understanding of the Teton River Canyon and arrogance on the part of the Bureau’s
design of the dam led to two billion dollars’ worth of damage in one of the worst dam
disasters in the region.3
The Teton Dam disaster occurred in an area of eastern Idaho where nearly ninetyfive percent of the population claimed membership in The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (often referred to as Mormons) according to the 1976 LDS Church
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Wayne J. Graham, “The Teton Dam Failure—An Effective Warning and Evacuation”
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Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water (New
York: Penguin Books, 1993), 407.
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Historian Bruce D. Blumell.4 The homogenous nature of the population involved in this
disaster and its recovery effort provides an unprecedented modern look at Mormon
interactions with the federal government. Hostility and mutual antagonism marked the
relationship between the LDS Church and federal and local governments from the midnineteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth century. This enmity
played out on both a national and a local stage, primarily through legal battles involving
polygamy and church owned businesses. Historians Leonard Arrington and Davis Bitton,
in their work, The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-day Saints argued that the
twentieth century brought a certain amount of accommodation of American government
and culture by the LDS Church. The church ended polygamy in 1890, divested itself of
its controlling interest in many of its businesses, began participating in national political
parties, and ended its cooperative economic systems. These changes to Mormonism
ended most of the legal wrangling between the church and government. Arrington and
Bitton concluded, “the church was, in effect, reoriented to incorporate the standards of
social, political, and economic behavior imposed by American Society, while at the same
time it attempted to retain as much of the ‘Kingdom’ outlook as possible.”5
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The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints prefers to be described using its full
name rather than being called the Mormon Church. In this thesis, I will use the term
Mormon Church because those outside the church commonly employ this name. In
addition to Mormon Church, I will use LDS Church or simply the church when
describing The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. I will refer to people
belonging to this church as Mormons, LDS, Saints, or members. “Style Guide—The
Name of the Church,” The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2013.
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Blumell, “The LDS Response to the Teton Dam Disaster in Idaho,” Sunstone Magazine,
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For Arrington and Bitton, this attempt to maintain the distinctive fundamentals of
Mormonism while changing elements of the church to adapt to mainstream American
culture actually led to only superficial modifications. Original nineteenth century church
principles that made Mormonism unique among other American sects undermined any
apparent changes in later years. The Mormon Experience argues that this failure to fully
integrate into American culture manifests itself in the church’s heavy influence on
members’ lives, continuing commitment to economic cooperation with the rise of their
welfare system, and the homogenous political makeup of the membership.6 Interactions
between the Mormon Church and various government agencies allow for a modern case
study that supports Arrington and Bitton’s argument. The Teton Dam recovery effort
orchestrated by the LDS Church demonstrated an event in Mormon history where the
church believed it had once again worked to accommodate American culture and
government, thereby further improving relations between itself and the government. Yet,
deeper analysis reveals that the Mormon experiences of the Teton Dam recovery period
confirm Arrington and Bitton’s assertions involving Mormon adaptations to American
culture as largely superficial.
The recovery effort following the collapse of the Teton Dam provided an
opportunity for eastern Idaho leaders and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints to change their historic perception of a mutually antagonistic
relationship with the federal government. Based on their performance following the
disaster, the church believed it had successfully worked to improve its interactions with
government agencies and ended hostile attitudes on both sides. Teton provided an
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opportunity for the LDS church, using its welfare system and priesthood (lay male
leadership) organizational structure to seamlessly work with the government agencies
sent to help flood victims in eastern Idaho. Church leaders used the positive interactions
between its members and the federal and local leaders to celebrate an effective
assimilation of its principles into mainstream culture, even using distinctive aspects of
Mormon culture and practice to enhance the government’s recovery efforts. While the
Teton Dam failure did encourage a previously unprecedented level of cooperation
between the federal or local government and the LDS Church, this recovery effort also
demonstrated an inability or unwillingness of the church to actually abandon its unique
beliefs and procedures.
An example of the church insisting on its religious tenets dictating its behavior
during the recovery period is manifested when LDS flood victims relied first on the
church to meet most of their needs during the summer of 1976. The church welfare
system arrived immediately following the floodwaters to provide for the most basic
material needs of the victims. LDS welfare services stayed several months to supply
food and other goods to the eastern Idahoans affected by the disaster. In addition to the
provisions presented by the church’s welfare program, the Red Cross set up a base of
operations in Idaho Falls to assist victims. However, the majority of the Mormon
residents believed they could not utilize the Red Cross because it violated the church’s
stance on the need to maintain self-sufficiency and avoid “handouts.” Mormon victims
also underused food stamps from the government because they viewed them as a kind of
“dole” system about which their doctrinal beliefs had warned them. The First Presidency
(the highest governing body of the church) eventually released a statement clarifying
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their position on government assistance, subsidies, and loans in the case of the Teton
Dam disaster, allowing members to avail themselves of these services. Yet, even after
this advice from the leadership of the church, many members found it difficult to utilize
any aid not offered by the church, and reverted to a trend of wariness toward outside
institutions, especially the federal government.
Even when using government agencies, local church leaders mediated
interactions between eastern Idaho Mormons and federal relief agencies, maintaining the
top down leadership style characteristic of the Mormon Church from its inception. The
local priesthood holders also organized a widespread cleanup effort to remove the mud
and debris from homes in the flood zone with volunteers from Idaho, Wyoming, and
Utah, preferring not to wait for any type of direction on this matter from government
agencies that arrived later. Local priesthood leaders also monitored all of the work done
in Rexburg and Sugar City by church volunteers or government agencies, which they
planned and discussed in priesthood correlation meetings occurring every morning for
approximately the first six weeks following the disaster. Agencies such as the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Small Business
Administration (SBA) agreed that using the Mormon priesthood system streamlined their
process and worked amicably with the local church leaders. While this arrangement
between the priesthood and outside agencies made the recovery period one of the most
efficient following any disaster in the United States, it demonstrated an unwillingness by
the church to fully submit to any government agency and allow it to function without
oversight by the priesthood.
The dam collapse allowed for a potential point of change in a larger narrative of
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Mormon history noted by mutual antagonism between the church and government. This
change is a matter of perception by members of the church and their leadership during the
late 1970s. The nature of the sources available regarding exchanges between church
leaders and representatives of government agencies does not yield quantifiable data that
confirms actual changes to church policy and behavior. The oral histories also do not
yield a balanced amount of information regarding reactions by non-Mormons and
government employees toward Mormon control of the recovery effort during this period.
These sources focus largely on Mormon responses to the collapse of the dam, the way the
church and government addressed the recovery effort, and how they believed this
changed the church and its relationship with the government.
The analysis in this thesis relies heavily on these oral history interviews
conducted by Ricks College (now Brigham Young University-Idaho), Utah State
University, and LDS Church historians in the years immediately following the collapse of
the dam. Ricks College combined some of these oral histories into a collection entitled
That Day in June: Reflections on the Teton Dam Disaster, but most of the interviews
reside as transcripts in BYU-Idaho’s Teton Dam Collection, the largest repository of
documents pertaining to the dam. Basing the argument of this thesis on largely Mormon
oral histories may seem problematic as many of the interviewees describe their subjective
reactions and religious beliefs as factual. However, my argument evaluates the
perceptions of Mormon members and leaders and their analysis of the recovery effort.
For this stated purpose, the largely unused Teton Dam oral history collection provides an
excellent resource to capture the response of the LDS Church membership to the events
following the disaster and adds needed analysis to the existing Teton Dam scholarship.
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Another potential problem arises from interviews performed by Bruce Blumell, LDS
Church Historian during the Teton Dam recovery period. Facing a Mormon interviewer,
some interviewees may have sensed that they could not be entirely objective or critical of
the LDS Church or its members. Government or Red Cross representatives represented a
small non-Mormon minority in eastern Idaho, and may have thought it necessary to
respond positively to Blumell about their interactions with the LDS Church.
Historians Marc Reisner and Donald Worster have produced compelling accounts
of the collapse of the Teton Dam in the context of examining water management in the
western U.S. Reisner and Worster both view the Teton Dam disaster as an unqualified
failure of the Bureau of Reclamation caused by the hubris of this institution and the
clamoring greed for water by westerners. My thesis does not delve into a larger
examination of western water management or the Bureau of Reclamation and its role in
Teton. Cadillac Desert and Rivers of Empire, by Reisner and Worster respectively, are
the definitive works on these issues. In these narratives addressing dams and irrigation in
the West, both Worster and Reisner discussed the relationship between Mormons and
dam building and cast it in a negative light. My work here builds on their assessment by
tying their analysis of Mormons to the Teton Dam specifically and continuing beyond the
dam disaster.
Mormon historians have also analyzed the Teton Dam disaster as a part of a larger
picture of Mormonism in America. Leonard Arrington, Davis Bitton, and F. Ross
Peterson used Teton to celebrate the recovery effort executed by the LDS Church as a
positive chapter in Mormon history. The analysis in this thesis agrees that Teton was
both a catastrophic event for eastern Idaho and the Bureau while providing the LDS

9
Church with an opportunity to prove the value and effectiveness of its welfare system and
priesthood leadership. However, further evaluation of the sources used reveals a more
nuanced judgment of the Mormon-led recovery effort. The success of the church resulted
not only from its laudatory efforts but also from an unprecedented level of
accommodation of the church’s practices and beliefs by government and other agencies
during the recovery period. The LDS Church concluded it achieved its stated goal of
improving its public image with its welfare system and doctrine of self-reliance following
the collapse of the dam. Nevertheless, without the cooperation and willingness of the
other organizations involved, the church could have returned to the historically
antagonistic relationship that marked its earlier interactions with the federal government.
While this thesis looks directly at Mormonism and how its distinctive beliefs and
leadership hierarchy influenced the recovery effort, it is not a direct analysis of Mormon
doctrine. I have utilized the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Writing Center’s
article “Religious Studies,” and the article “A Guide to Writing in Religious Studies” by
Faye Halpern, et al. to make a distinction between a doctrinal evaluation of Mormonism,
which this thesis is not, and a historical look at a religious group, which is the approach I
employed. These sources also provide excellent information and instruction for
historians looking at religious sources and guidance for maintaining objectivity in the
overall analysis of an event that involves a religious group.7 Many of the personal
accounts I rely on speak in religious tones and terminology unique to the LDS Church
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and I will endeavor to make it clear to the reader that this is the interviewee’s perspective.
Many of the individuals whose experiences I analyze were both local leaders in
the Mormon Church and in local government or business and provide the exclusive
vantage point of expressing a valid assessment of Mormon interactions with
representatives of government agencies. All of the Madison County Commissioners and
Civil Defense leaders belonged to the LDS Church and held leadership positions within
the church. They worked in both their civil and religious positions without making a
distinction between the two roles.8 These men believed that they participated in a turning
point in Mormon history where Mormons and the U.S. government both worked toward
and achieved a more amicable relationship and ended more than a century’s worth of
reciprocated antagonism.
The first chapter of this thesis establishes the nineteenth and early twentieth
century struggles between the LDS Church and local and federal government. The
second chapter addresses the longstanding relationship between Mormons and the Teton
Dam, where the supposed need for the dam, the construction phase, and its eventual
collapse are treated. The third chapter examines the historiography surrounding this
disaster from its place in the narrative of western water management to its role in
Mormon history. The LDS Welfare system’s contributions following the disaster and its
intense desire to protect the members and church from too much reliance on outside
agencies comprise the analysis in chapter four. The fifth chapter looks into the use of the
local priesthood leadership to coordinate the recovery efforts of the church and other
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T. Bardell Klingler, interviewed by Bruce Blumell, July 5, 1976, box 2, vol. 1, page
154, MSSI 2, BYUISC. Mark G. Ricks, interviewed by Bruce Blumell, July 5, 1976, box
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agencies outside the church. The massive volunteer effort that chapter six explores
depicts the belief by many priesthood leaders in eastern Idaho that church members had a
wide variety of assets to draw upon in a disaster scenario and could, in future situations,
maintain an even greater level of independence from other organizations.
The money, provisions, and time donated by the LDS Church to the recovery
efforts in eastern Idaho in 1976 undoubtedly contributed to a more efficient rebuilding
period that allowed the victims to restore their damaged lives more quickly. Members of
the church claimed to have the faith they placed in the policies and doctrines espoused by
their religion confirmed. Local and general leadership concluded that they carried out
their responsibilities in such a way as to secure a more positive image from those outside
the church. This environmental crisis provided an opportunity for the LDS Church in
1976 to showcase its beliefs and practices, which the federal government and mainstream
American culture had historically found objectionable. It also allowed the church to
create a narrative based on its work following the collapse of the dam, which showed the
value of its priesthood leadership, welfare system, communal spirit, and the doctrine of
self-sufficiency.
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CHAPTER 2: A “CONFLICT BETWEEN SOVEREIGNS”
The distinctive traits of Mormonism discussed in this thesis emerged in the 1840s.
Fleeing persecution and facing a daunting crossing in unknown territory reinforced the
priority of the LDS community over the individual and the submission to the authority of
strong leaders. Donald Worster, in Rivers of Empire, argued that this emphasis on group
welfare, which went directly against the popular Jeffersonian notion that glorified selfsufficient farmers, would not have developed in some of the Mormons’ earlier homes in
New York, Ohio, Illinois, or Missouri. Believing that members would quickly leave
when tempted with easy opportunities to make their own way, Worster asserted that the
trek to Utah solidified the Mormon ideal of community and allowed its members to
submit to the church hierarchy in the pursuit of collective success. “In Utah, the Church
had an excellent environment for creating an agrarian society ruled by a central power.
There the hierarchy could insist […] on cohesion, dominance, and discipline.”9 This
“cohesion, dominance, and discipline” followed the Saints north to eastern Idaho and
forward one hundred and thirty years later to the time of the Teton Dam disaster.10
Not long after the murder of Joseph Smith, founder and first president of the LDS
Church, at Carthage Jail in the summer of 1844, Brigham Young assumed the leadership
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Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American
West, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 80-81.
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Within the LDS Church, the term “Saints” indicates members. Those in the early
church employed the term heavily when describing the membership. James K. Lyon,
“Saints,” Encyclopedia of Mormonism, Daniel H. Ludlow, ed. (New York: Macmillan,
1992), 1149-1150.
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of the main congregation of the church.11 Early in Young’s tenure as president of the
church, he realized the necessity of moving his followers out of Nauvoo, Illinois where
they continued to endure persecution by outsiders. Young researched land that belonged
to Mexico until the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Under escalating pressure from
local mobs and government officials, Young and his followers began to leave their homes
in search of a peaceful existence in the West. The exodus involved several thousand
miles of arduous travel to a destination largely unknown.12 Upon entering the Salt Lake
Valley in present-day Utah in 1847, Young believed he had found their sanctuary and
members quickly began to make it their home.
The isolation and their work in irrigation (discussed in the following chapter)
allowed Mormons in Utah to flourish. Their success encouraged the church to expand its
borders by establishing new settlements radiating out from the Salt Lake Valley. Thomas
E. Ricks, a convert to the LDS Church in the latter half of the nineteenth century, worked
on the Northern Pacific Railroad. These experiences with the railroad allowed him to
travel through the Upper Snake River Valley, where he eventually led a Mormon
colonization effort in 1882.13 Ricks contacted church president, John Taylor, to inform
him of his intentions to form a colony in the Idaho territory, which he called Rexburg.
President Taylor advised him to avoid antagonizing non-Mormons and Native Americans
already settled in the area. He encouraged Ricks to follow the successful pattern of
Mormon colonization employed by the church for thirty years by forming a close-knit
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community. This strategy allowed for two obvious benefits, the first because close
proximity would make gathering together for religious meetings easier and the second
allowed for a collective approach to finances, irrigation, security, and other secular
matters.14
Shortly after its formation, Rexburg experienced a rash of anti-Mormon sentiment
from Idaho courts, government, and residents. An anti-Mormon jury subjected Thomas
Ricks to a lengthy trial and sentenced him to a term in the territorial prison for polygamy
in 1889. President Wilford Woodruff issued a Manifesto prohibiting future polygamous
unions in 1890, causing the Idaho court to lose interest in Ricks’ case and set the
conviction aside.15 Law enforcement found it difficult to apprehend and prosecute
polygamists and soon lost interest in this method of provoking Mormons. Anti-Mormon
sentiment in Idaho soon found more effective methods of antagonizing LDS
communities.
Idaho Anti-Mormons struck a blow at Rexburg Mormons when they renamed the
town “Kaintuck” from 1889-1893. Harvey Walker “Kentucky” Smith assisted with antiMormon judicial and political moves in the territory and, unsurprisingly, townspeople in
Rexburg disliked him and referred to him derisively as “Kaintuck.” Frederick Thomas
Dubois had a longstanding feud with Idaho Mormons who had refused to vote for him.
Dubois responded as a U. S. Marshall by hunting down polygamists for arrest. His
ultimate revenge came when, as a delegate for the Idaho territorial delegation to
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Latter-day Saints (Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007),
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Washington, D.C., he used this opportunity to rename the Rexburg post office after
“Kaintuck” Smith. Rexburg officially became Kaintuck for four years. Some outside of
Idaho agreed, that “under territorial government the Mormons have been dealt with with
a pretty high hand.”16
One of the final official battles between Mormons and their non-Mormon
neighbors came when Thomas Ricks secured the Fremont County seat (which
encompassed present-day Fremont, Jefferson, Madison, and part of Butte counties).
Ricks and the rest of Rexburg assumed that Rexburg would be the county seat as it was
the second largest city in Idaho in 1893. However, Governor William McConnell
designated St. Anthony the temporary county seat until an 1894 election. St. Anthony,
Market Lake, and Rexburg all vied for the county seat at the ballot box. Each city
campaigned heavily to secure the seat of Fremont County, with Rexburg heavily favored
to win. Despite its superior number of voters, Rexburg lost to St. Anthony. Many in
Rexburg attributed Rexburg’s defeat to anti-Mormon sentiment. However, Rexburg
historian David Crowder argued, “that for St. Anthony to win meant that a substantial
number of Mormon voters living outside Rexburg had voted for St. Anthony.” Religious
leaders in Rexburg encouraged the townspeople to let the loss go, end their complaining
about anti-Mormon movements, and focus on the future prosperity of Rexburg.17 While
Rexburg did move past the anti-Mormon attitudes, it maintained a wariness toward state
and federal government interference long after the nineteenth century evidenced by their
behavior in the summer of 1976.
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The anti-Mormon movement in eastern Idaho mirrored a statewide trend that
utilized judicial and legislative means to rile Mormons in Idaho in the late nineteenth
century. E. Leo Lyman argued that “controversy surrounding Mormonism may have
been an even larger factor in Idaho politics than it was in Utah during their later territorial
periods.”18 The opposition in Idaho more easily overpowered Mormons than antiMormon movements in Utah for several reasons. Communities in eastern Idaho tended
to be mixtures of Mormon and non-Mormon populations in equal proportions, and the
local governments were not theocratic like their Utah counterparts.19 The anti-Mormon
movement in Idaho had several objections to the Mormon presence in their state (the
largest Mormon population outside Utah). Their initial objections came from a
continuing stream of Mormons migrating northward from Utah, the tendency to form
exclusive social and religious communities, their economic cooperatives from which they
financially benefited, and the belief that they voted as a bloc for Democratic candidates
and platforms. Radical anti-Mormon Republicans in Idaho used the Mormon practice of
polygamy as justification to disenfranchise Mormon voters (including many Mormons
who did not participate in polygamy and those who had recently left the church) in the
state, thereby lessening support for Idaho Democrats.20
Those involved in the Idaho anti-Mormon movement believed that polygamy led
church leaders into other illegal activities including evasion of law enforcement officers
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or potentially plotting to overthrow the government. They reasoned that members of the
church did not vote freely because a “subversive, treasonous priesthood” dictated to
them, and used this excuse to attempt to disenfranchise Mormons within the state.21
Because they could not infringe on a U.S. citizen’s right to practice his religion, they
formed a test oath act that did not actually mention the LDS Church by name, yet left
little doubt about the identity of their intended target:
any order, organization, or association which teaches, advises, counsels, or
encourages its members or devotees, or any other persons, to commit the crime of
bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime defined by law, either as a rite or a
ceremony of such order…” was [not] to be permitted to vote, hold office, or serve
on a jury.22
The Test-Oath Act effectively prevented most participation by Mormons in government
during the years it was in effect (1884-1892); however, it did not harm Mormon
communities as much as its authors believed it would. Mormon communities had already
learned to survive independently of most government institutions. They used their own
church courts to enforce their teachings and formed their own schools to avoid battles
over public school administration.23
Idaho entered the Union in 1890 with a warning to Mormons that an anti-Mormon
territory had now become an anti-Mormon state. Worried that Mormons would be able
to vote again, radical Republicans worked to add a retroactive clause to the Test Oath Act
stating that anyone who had belonged to a church that practiced polygamy on January 1,
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1888, would be disenfranchised. These Republicans drafted a state constitution that
effectively made Idaho an anti-Mormon state if approved by Congress. Under fire, the
Mormon Church responded to these laws by making some concessions. President
Woodruff’s 1890 Manifesto ending the practice of polygamy quelled some fears about
the future of polygamy in the LDS Church.24 He also answered critics wary of the
church’s theocratic hierarchy by assuring them that the LDS Church was firmly
committed to a separation of church and state. Despite these concessions, Congress
overwhelmingly approved Idaho’s anti-Mormon constitution.25 Eventually the antiMormon movement weakened due to internal differences and the Mormons’ willingness
to adapt their religious practices to meet Idaho law. Idaho legislators repealed the TestOath Act in 1894.26 Nevertheless, some anti-Mormon elements remained in the Idaho
Constitution until 1982, demonstrating the enduring anti-Mormon sentiment in the state
as late as the latter half of the twentieth-century.27
Anti-Mormon movements extended beyond state politics onto the national scene
with the passage of the Edmunds and the Edmunds-Tucker Acts. The Mormon Question:
Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth Century America, by Sarah
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Barringer Gordon, provides a comprehensive and fascinating look at this constitutional
law crisis. Gordon labeled the fight between the Mormon Church and the federal
government a “conflict between sovereigns.”28 She argued that Mormons unjustly
received no support or protection from the Missouri or Illinois state governments. For
Gordon, the federal government had the responsibility of addressing the expulsion of
Mormons from Illinois and Missouri. When the church settled in Utah, it was not yet a
territory, making the issue of sovereignty ambiguous (at least in Mormon minds) in terms
of control over local government. The federal government chose polygamy for the
battleground in the legal war against Mormon theocratic sovereignty.29 In 1882, the
Edmunds Act became federal law, disenfranchising and barring any men practicing
polygamy from juries or public office. While it was decidedly a victory for antipolygamists and the federal government’s power, it still did not strike a major blow at the
Mormon theocracy.30
The passage of the Edmunds-Tucker Act in 1887 hit the Mormon theocracy and
practice of polygamy with more force than the 1882 effort. The later act added more
restrictions on marriage and the rights of those practicing polygamy, disenfranchised
Utah women, and ended the church’s Perpetual Emigrating Fund Company.31 The U.S.
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Supreme Court upheld an attempt to use the Edmunds-Tucker Act to dismantle the
corporation of the Mormon Church in 1890, allowing for the confiscation of all of its
property except for buildings utilized for worship.32 These extreme acts by Congress
forced Mormons to make drastic changes to their religion in order to survive, such as
abandoning polygamy. Gordon concluded her book by questioning who won the battle
for sovereignty. She argued that the federal government soundly defeated the church in a
constitutional battle. Nevertheless, Gordon indicated that the church quickly recovered
financially and lost very few of its members during this period, leading her to conclude
that the government’s victory was “symbolic” at best.33
After the legal wrangling of the late nineteenth century ended, the church
refocused its energies repairing the economic damage done to the church, assisting its
members financially, and attempting to either assimilate into mainstream culture or avoid
it. Leonard Arrington argued in The Mormon Experience that after fifty years of conflict
between the church and federal government, “Mormon institutions were undergoing
profound changes, but the basic religious programs were as vigorous as they were during
the administration of Brigham Young.”34 While the Mormon hierarchy moved away
from having direct control and involvement in communities through managing irrigation,
operating their own schools, and having their own political parties, they maintained what
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Worster called, a “shadow theocracy.”35 Although the outside trappings of the Mormon
theocracy fell away, as Arrington stated, the doctrines and religious programs endured.
The Mormon hierarchy continued to influence its members heavily but in a less direct
manner.
Matthew C. Godfrey, in his work Religion, Politics, and Sugar: The Mormon
Church, the Federal Government, and the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 1907-1921,
provided an excellent look at the church’s transition from direct involvement in business
into a convoluted “shadow theocracy” with a less-defined influence on Mormon-run
enterprises. When the Utah Sugar Company fell on hard times in the 1890s and could not
repay its investors, President Wilford Woodruff circulated a letter to bishops and stake
presidents in Utah encouraging them to support the company. Woodruff believed that the
Utah Sugar Company would prove an economic boon to church members by presenting
affordable sugar to consumers and more jobs for the members of the church in Utah.
Woodruff supported his sentiments by investing $180,000 into the enterprise and calling
Heber J. Grant on a special church assignment to raise more funds to prop up the
company. In 1907, the Idaho Sugar Company and the Western Idaho Sugar Company
joined the Utah Sugar Company, forming the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company with Prophet
Joseph F. Smith as its president.36
In 1911, the House of Representatives evaluated the American Sugar Refining
Company to see if it violated the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. As part of this
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investigation, they evaluated American Sugar’s relationship with Utah-Idaho Sugar.37
Senator Hardwick of Georgia and his committee accused and established that the Sugar
Trust (American Sugar and Utah-Idaho Sugar) had violated antitrust legislation, but never
actually penalized them. The real damage resulted from accusations regarding too much
involvement by the Mormon hierarchy in the company, their willingness to manipulate
their followers to turn a profit, and their followers’ inability or unwillingness to challenge
their church leaders.38 Although the church had tried to move out of economic concerns
in Mormon-dominated regions, the transition proved rocky at best, bringing more
negative publicity and power struggles with the U.S. government in the early twentieth
century.
After constantly facing-off against the government for over half a century, “the
Mormons increasingly behaved as a normal religious denomination, rather than as a
separate nationality or a millennial proto-state,” argued historian Nathan B. Oman.
Oman asserted political restraint by the church marked the remainder of the twentieth
century. It carefully avoided political issues and only occasionally involved itself with
moral issues that pertained to LDS doctrines such as Prohibition, gambling, and the Equal
Rights Amendment.39 By the 1960s and 1970s their once radical adherence to traditional
moral values became what historians Marvin S. Hill and James B. Allen termed strongly
conservative; “Mormondom had become in its ideals a microcosm of what America was,
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not what it was becoming.”40 Their accommodations to conservative American political
and social norms were mostly on the surface, however, while their unique doctrines
remained the same.41 The church hierarchy focused its efforts on generating positive
publicity highlighting facets of their religion and community long overshadowed by the
negativity of the previous one hundred years.
Eastern Idaho communities dominated by Mormons participated in the active
separation of their church from government and cooperative business ventures. Their
reliance on their religion for political and cultural guidance remained intact from the
nineteenth century as members moved into the latter-half of the twentieth century. After
struggling with government on a local and national level, most Mormons in eastern Idaho
maintained a guarded attitude toward these institutions. The Bureau of Reclamation and
its water policies and projects in the West proved a glaring exception to their negative
feelings toward government. Irrigation and dam building had played a large role in the
success of western Mormon settlements. When the Bureau continued its work of
“making the desert blossom” in the twentieth century, the LDS Church overwhelmingly
supported its efforts.
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CHAPTER 3: INSATIABLE WATER NEEDS, FAULTY GROUTING CURTAINS,
AND THE SHORT LIFE OF THE TETON DAM
The relationship between Mormons in eastern Idaho and the Teton Dam began
long before its collapse. Manipulating rivers to irrigate the arid West had a history
stretching back to the arrival of members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints under the direction of their prophet Brigham Young in the mid-nineteenth
century.42 Marc Reisner, in his work Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its
Disappearing Water, claimed that within hours of reaching the Salt Lake Valley the early
Saints began constructing irrigation canals. Reisner asserted, “Without realizing it, they
were laying the foundation of the most ambitious desert civilization the world has seen.”
Critical of both the LDS Church and western water management programs, Reisner went
on to declare that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, formed in 1902, was “based on
Mormon experience, guided by Mormon laws, [and] run largely by Mormons.”43
Michael C. Robinson, in his work Water for the West: The Bureau of Reclamation
1902-1977, lauded the early Mormon system of irrigation. Robinson suggested that
Mormon success with irrigation in Utah rested heavily on their luck in settling near
several small streams and in their highly developed sense of community. This sense of
community placed the collective goal above the desires of individuals, “To Latter-day
Saints, reclaiming the desert was part of ‘building up the Kingdom of God on Earth.’
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Thus, community interest was placed above individual gain.” Sympathetic to the Bureau
of Reclamation’s mission of providing water for the arid states of the West, Robinson
believed that Mormon pioneers in the Salt Lake Valley provided the groundwork for
larger water projects that it would later develop beginning in 1902.44
From 1904, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers
evaluated various sites on or near the Teton River for the possible placement of a dam to
store water, produce power, and prevent flooding. One of the first proposed sites they
assessed in 1932 lay fifteen miles from the future dam site in the Teton River Canyon.
They rejected this site because it would not maximize irrigation and flood control in the
area due to its inability to completely manage the river drain off. The Bureau of
Reclamation returned to the project in 1946 looking at two sites on Canyon Creek, but
found these also could not grant enough control of the Teton River. The Bureau
proposed a smaller dam at the mouth of the canyon in 1956. The Bureau claimed this
particular site could only control flooding in the area but would fail to provide any
irrigational benefits.45 Without the possibility of improving irrigation, many residents of
the Upper Snake River Valley concurred this project lacked merit.
Agriculture dominated Mormon communities in eastern Idaho, and with this
pursuit followed a need for more irrigation developments in the northern reaches of
Mormon country. The nature of the soil in the Snake River Plain perfectly suited Idaho’s
signature agricultural product, the potato, with its loose and somewhat sandy soil.
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Unfortunately, this type of soil drains quickly, requiring copious amounts of water to
make it profitable for farming. The Snake River brings in a considerable amount of water
from the spring runoff on the Yellowstone Plateau and Grand Teton Mountains, but the
water continues down the Snake before farmers can fully utilize it. A drought in 1961
and a flood in 1962 hit eastern Idaho hard, causing several hundred thousand dollars in
damage and led to another serious look at constructing a dam in the Teton River
Canyon.46
A committee formed between the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation in 1956 to evaluate the Upper Snake River Basin, which included some
initial investigatory work on the Teton Project. In 1961 and 1962, the Bureau took
several core samples at the site where they eventually constructed the Teton Dam. The
Bureau also evaluated the geological feasibility of the original dam site and a site further
up the canyon. Deeming both locations geologically sound for a possible dam, the
Bureau favored the original site because it promised greater irrigation and flood control
benefits. Several reports compiled by geologists remarked that seepage from the
reservoir in large quantities could occur. In March 1962, the Corps of Engineers
recommended the proposed Teton Project with a dam at the original site.47
Reisner argued that while the region debated the possibility of a dam over more
than half a century, it received authorization and began construction in a “great hurry.”48
He attributed this sudden desire to move forward with the project to one local man, “a
46

Reisner, 384-385.

47

U.S. Department of the Interior. Teton Dam Failure Review Group. April 1977.
Failure of the Teton Dam: A Report of Findings, by William F. Eikenberry et al. U.S.
Government Printing Office, Denver, 6.
48

Reisner, 385.

27
crotchety Mormon farmer” named Willis Walker. Walker served as the president of the
Fremont-Madison Irrigation District and united farmers in this district behind the cause of
a potential Teton Dam.49 Reisner acerbically pointed out the irony of a Mormon farmer
calling for federal spending on a dam and irrigation project. He quoted critic of the dam
Russell Brown, a senior research engineer for Allied Chemical Corporation, “Mormons
get burned up when they read about someone buying a bottle of mouthwash with food
stamps, but they love big water projects. They only object to nickel-and-dime welfare.
They love it in great big gobs.”50
On September 7, 1964, a public law authorized the construction of the Teton Dam
at its present site.51 The Office of Design and Construction of the Bureau designed the
dam out of its Denver Federal Center.52 After Harold Arthur, the Director of Design and
Construction, completed the design in early 1971, the Bureau called for construction bids
that included all facets of the dam project except the mechanical and electrical aspects.
On December 13, 1971, the Bureau awarded Morrison-Knudsen-Kiewit the contract for
39.5 million dollars and told them to proceed the following day.53 Excavators began
working on the dam site in February 1972. Workers broke ground before the opposition
had time to organize a public forum addressing the potential merits or problems posed by
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the Teton Dam.54
On June 2, 1972, a conference regarding the construction of the Teton Dam
convened in Idaho Falls, with the opposition to the dam heavily represented. Many
concerned about the environment, the safety of the site, and the necessity of the project
voiced their disagreement with the position that the dam project had value. Robert
Sherwood and Paul Jeppson from the Idaho Fish and Game Department deplored the
effects of the dam on the fish population, which would suffer due to higher river water
temperatures. The deer in the region would also lose thousands of grazing acres along
the river. Many skeptical of the dam questioned the actual economic value and benefit.55
A report by the Bureau admitted that the dam would only provide a couple more inches
of water to farmers who already received a fair amount of water without the dam. The
Teton Dam promised local farmers 132 inches of water per year; an extreme figure by
western standards and on par with the annual rainfall of tropical forests.56
The most alarming arguments against the dam focused on potential safety issues,
when combined with the negative environmental impact and perceived lack of economic
benefit made the dam look like more trouble than it was worth. Russell Brown pointed
out a major issue at the Idaho Falls meeting: the proposed dam site resided in the center
of a major risk earthquake zone.57 Reisner recalled an internal 1972 Bureau
memorandum penned by geologist Dave Schleicher where he recounted several serious
flaws with the dam site of which he believed the Bureau remained ignorant. He pointed
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out that within thirty miles of the dam five earthquakes had occurred in the last five
years. Schleicher expressed concern that he could not find any evidence in project
documents where the Bureau acknowledged those risks. His memorandum concluded:
A final point is that flooding in response to seismic or other failure of the dam—
probably most likely at the time of highest water—would make the flood of
February 1962 look like small potatoes. Since such a flood could be anticipated,
we might consider a series of strategically-placed motion-picture cameras to
document the process…
Someone within the Bureau edited the memorandum to remove Schleicher’s alarmist
tone before passing it on to Robbie Robison, the Bureau’s on-site Chief engineer.58
Aside from seismic risks, geological studies revealed that the canyon walls and
floor presented an exceptional challenge for dam engineers. Drilling tests conducted over
a period of several years before the construction of the dam demonstrated that fissures
riddled the walls of the canyon, increasing the likelihood of leaks from the reservoir. The
Bureau performed grouting tests that involved pumping cement into crevices on the south
abutment of the dam to ascertain whether the Bureau’s plan would effectively address the
highly porous canyon walls. The Bureau did not perform grouting tests on the north
abutment of the dam where they would later discover enormous fissures.59
The Bureau’s handling of the porous nature of the canyon wall calls into question
its full understanding of the terrain they chose and its willingness to admit that it had
never faced a site like this on any of its previous projects. The Bureau’s engineers had a
near perfect dam building record from the beginning of the twentieth century (the
Fontenelle Dam in Wyoming threatened to collapse in 1965, but the Bureau salvaged the
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situation with quick repairs, preventing a disaster). Robbie Robison, in a memo to his
superiors, called attention to “unusually large” fissures found in the right abutment of the
dam, one eleven feet wide and another one hundred feet long. The Bureau initially
missed these “unusually large” crevices in its preliminary assessment and actually
decided against grouting them in the interest of maintaining its construction schedule.60
Clifford Okeson, a Bureau geologist who examined the dam site, recalled that the Teton
Dam required more grouting than any previous Bureau dam. He also remembered that
the Bureau decided against filling an eleven-foot fissure discovered in November 1974
because it would have delayed the project.61
The earth filled embankment of the Teton Dam reached 305 feet (5,322 feet above
sea level) with the crest at 3,100 feet across when dam construction ended in November
1975. The Bureau began to fill the reservoir a month earlier and it achieved a depth of
185 feet in May of 1976.62 The snowpack during the winter of 1975-76 reached levels
well above one hundred percent and in some areas over two hundred percent of the
average snow water equivalents. The Bureau had cautiously implemented rules about the
rate of filling a reservoir, especially for a newly constructed dam, that resided over five
thousand feet above sea level.63 To detect any type of problems with any portion of the
dam or reservoir, the Bureau kept the rate of fill at or below one foot a day for the
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reservoir with daily inspections at and below the dam for leaks.64
Robbie Robison wrote in March 1976 to Harold Arthur in Denver requesting
permission to accelerate the rate to two feet per day in an effort to speed up the filling of
the reservoir and truly test the effectiveness of the Bureau’s elaborate grout curtain.
Arthur consented to the two feet per day limit for May of that year.65 Reisner compared
this justification to “arguing for a hundred-mile-per-hour speed limit on the grounds that
motorists would spend less time on dangerous highways if they drove twice as fast.”66
The greater than normal spring runoff on the Teton River actually increased the rate of
fill to three or four feet per day several times in April and May. With the reservoir rising
rapidly, Robison sent a faxogram to Denver stating that the river outlet works and the
spillway gates were not yet functional and asking for advice on this matter. In the mail at
the time of the flood, a message from Denver dated June 4, 1976, reassured Robison that
“the river outlet works need not be used prior to completion […] unless problems directly
related to filling of the reservoir develop in the foundation, embankment or structures.”
The letter did recommend that construction crews should complete these projects as soon
as possible.67 Without construction completed on the spillway and the river works outlet
(the construction schedule had the main structure of the dam completed in March, but
several other projects remained unfinished at the time of collapse in June), the Bureau
possessed no means to control the rate of fill on the reservoir.68 The sunny and warm
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days in early June quickly melted the snowpack and inundated a Teton Reservoir that had
no functional safety valve to release the increasing pressure on the dam.
Before June 3, inspections of the dam and riverbed below the dam showed no
signs of abnormal leaks or seepage. On June 3, inspectors observed two small leaks
1,300 and 1,500 feet downstream from the right abutment of the dam.69 Inspectors
carefully completed visual checks on June 4, paying close attention to the north side of
the canyon downstream of the right toe of the dam and the right abutment.70 Inspectors
found no new leaks until 7:00 a.m. on June 5, when an inspector spotted leakage 5,200
feet up the right abutment. The inspector informed Robison, who quickly made his way
to the dam. Three more leaks sprang up on the actual dam between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m.
that Saturday morning, some on the seam of the dam and the right abutment. At this
point Robison considered alerting officials in Madison and Fremont counties situated
directly below the dam, but, after talking to his superiors in Washington, Denver, and
Boise, he decided that the situation did not yet present an emergency.71
At 10:15 a.m., a wet spot developed forty feet up the face of the dam near the
right abutment and began to leak and erode the embankment. Those near the dam heard a
loud roar and the sound of rushing water at 10:30 a.m. with the volume of water leaking
visibly increasing. Robison visually inspected the eroding area on the right abutment and
saw a tunnel thirty to forty feet in length and six feet in diameter on the face of the dam.
He sent two bulldozers to the scene in an attempt to fill the rapidly expanding holes in the
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dam. Next, he decided to notify the sheriffs of Madison and Fremont counties of
potential flooding and a possible need for an evacuation. The bulldozers worked for
nearly thirty minutes when they lost traction on the embankment and the drivers leaped to
safety as their machines floated off downstream at 11:30 a.m.72
While the bulldozer operators frantically tried to fill the burgeoning hole on the
face of the dam, a whirlpool developed in the reservoir, fifteen to twenty feet from the
dam. Bulldozers on the upstream side of the dam tried to push rock material into the
whirlpool without success and Robison removed them at 11:45 a.m., when a sinkhole
developed on the downstream face of the dam.73 At this point, the Bureau could do
nothing but observe the dam it built dissolve into the roiling water. At 11:55 a.m., the
crest of the dam collapsed and two minutes later the embankment crumbled, spilling the
contents of the reservoir down the canyon in enormous, brown waves.74 In less than two
hours, the situation at the Teton Dam went from a lesser concern to a full-blown disaster
on a path to destroy everything in the valley.
Robison had notified the sheriffs in Madison and Fremont counties around 11:00
a.m. to evacuate all low-lying areas below the dam, but he had only said “there was a
possibility the dam would go but it would ‘go slowly.’”75 This description of the
impending demise of the dam conveyed little sense of urgency and no scope of the
potential disaster to the sheriffs, who consequently took no immediate action to warn the
people. Others, such as police officials and radio announcers, who witnessed the demise
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of the dam understood the situation better than Robison and tried to vociferously warn
people living below the dam.
Warnings about the collapse of the dam came from radio and television
broadcasts, phone calls from friends and relatives, and visits from concerned neighbors.
Eight miles downstream, the little town of Wilford took the first direct hit from a twentyfoot wall of water spilling out of the canyon. Between 12:20 and 12:30 p.m. the water
rushed through Wilford, effectively wiping it off the map. The water ripped 120 of the
154 homes in the town from their foundations and washed them further downstream.76
Martha Black, a resident of Wilford, had just sat down to lunch when a neighbor pounded
on her door and yelled at her “Get out! Get out! Get out! The Teton Dam has burst!
The flood is coming!” She and her husband grabbed armfuls of clothes and some
keepsakes and drove to safety in St. Anthony.77
Most residents of Wilford escaped town before the flood roared in; however, Glen
Bedford was not as lucky. Bedford met his in-laws, the Liedings, at his sister-in-law’s
home in St. Anthony and saw Mrs. Lieding in the front yard, but not his father-in-law
(who was around the back of the house). Bedford raced back to Wilford to look for his
father-in-law and grab remaining mementos at the Lieding home. Mr. Lieding chased
after him, arriving in Wilford in time to see what appeared to be a fifty-foot wall of water
emerging from the canyon only a mile and a half away. He called to Bedford, who told
him he would be right behind him on his way to St. Anthony. Beyond recognition among
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the debris, volunteers did not find Bedford’s body until eleven days after the flood.78 The
Teton Dam failure took eleven lives over the course of the disaster; including six
drowning deaths in Fremont County.79
Residents of Sugar City lived twelve miles southwest of the dam. Sugar City
resident Donna Webster first heard about the collapse from radio broadcaster Don Ellis,
on Rexburg's KRXX at a quarter to noon. Both Donna and her husband expressed little
concern over the dam breaking because they had experienced flooding before.
Nevertheless, Ellis persisted in yelling warnings from the dam site and imploring people
to gather their families and head for higher ground. Donna attributed her survival to
Ellis’s broadcast. She heeded his warning, and in her confusion, all she could think to
bring from home was bowl of bread dough: so she grabbed it and left.80 At 1:30 that
afternoon a fifteen-foot wave of water engulfed Sugar City damaging almost every home
in town.81
Keith Walker, a resident of Rexburg and the chairman of the Madison County
Commissioners, viewed the flood from a plane. In the air, Walker “kept hoping that as
big as the valley was, even with that much pressure coming, that the water would spread
out and lose its force.” Walker approached the crest of the flood just as it spilled over the
roof of the Wilford LDS church building, at which point he realized this flood had the
potential to be worse than any the valley had ever seen. He radioed back to another
county commissioner and described the situation to him. An aerial perspective truly
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captured the horror of horses and cows vainly trying to out run or swim the wall of water,
the spectacle of floating homes and cars, and the ugliness of the wave “that didn’t really
look like water, it had so much dirt and dust in it. It looked like a big cloud of dust, like a
terrific wind storm.”82
The largest city in Madison County, Rexburg, lay fifteen miles from the dam.83
While the rest of the town occupies the valley on the edge of the foothills, Ricks College
rested on higher ground overlooking the town. Rexburg had over two hours from the
initial warning until the floodwaters rolled through town, so police and neighbors
effectively evacuated the area. Most residents sought refuge at Ricks on College Hill
where they had a close, unobstructed view of the floodwaters washing away their
homes.84 Warren R. Widdison heard about the failure of the dam from several neighbors
just before noon. He thought that they must be misinformed, but decided to verify their
story at the fire department. While there, Widdison heard the call come in to evacuate
Rexburg. He and his wife moved the contents of their basement to the top floor of their
home and loaded their car with emergency supplies. Widdison worked at a bank in town
and wanted to drive by to make sure employees had turned off the power and vacated the
building. Driving by the bank a man yelled at the Widdisons to leave because just a few
blocks away the flood started its rampage through downtown Rexburg. Reaching a safe
vantage point, Widdison and his wife watched as at least six feet of water washed through
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Main Street, with rolling barrels, logs, and other debris.85
Idaho Falls, sixty-three miles from the dam, had thirteen hours to prepare for the
arrival of the floodwaters. Late Saturday and early Sunday sandbagging crews worked
rapidly to build up the banks of the Snake River in an effort to control flooding as it went
through town. The sandbagging effort effectively prevented the flooding of most homes
and businesses near the river. The biggest concern in Idaho Falls became the Broadway
Bridge. Debris slammed into the bridge and increased flooding in the vicinity. Crews
tried unsuccessfully to blow up the bridge with dynamite. When this did not work, city
officials decided to dig emergency channels to divert the floodwaters around the bridge,
which secured its survival during the night.86 The flood continued through Idaho Falls,
Shelley, and Blackfoot until it reached the American Falls Reservoir, thirty-six hours
later and 150 miles from the dam, where the reservoir easily accommodated the extra
water.87
Wayne J. Graham, in his 2008 presentation at the Association of the State Dam
Safety Officials, declared of the Teton Dam collapse, whether “measured in terms of
either dam height or volume of water released, the failure was the worst in U.S.
history.”88 Marc Reisner claimed that the resulting flood was “the second-largest flood in
North America since the last Ice Age.”89 The flood in Rexburg peaked at 6:30 p.m. when
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the waters began to recede, leaving an unimaginable path of destruction and damage that
made the sunny morning of June 5th seem like a lifetime ago. Dorothy Hegsted of
Rexburg vividly recalled what the Teton left behind when the waters withdrew, “leaving
in its wake hundreds of bawling cattle and dead livestock in the streets, stores gutted,
houses off their foundations, some moved blocks away, cars leaning against houses,
debris and logs piled up.”90
Gary Olsen, the director of the Manwaring Center at Ricks College at the time of
the flood, called the radio station after he heard about the failure of the dam and told them
to announce that “rather than have people just get out of their homes, to come up here to
the campus and check in at the Manwaring Center.”91 Olsen and his staff pulled out large
sheets of paper and started writing down the names of the flood victims who poured into
the facility. Eventually they gathered all of the available typewriters and began typing
the lists. While the water rolled into Rexburg, Olsen started marshalling his resources.
He assigned volunteers to set-up chairs for people to sit on, communicated with food
services requesting them to have a meal ready for service at 5:00 p.m., and began
organizing clothing donations that had already started to come in for flood victims.92 The
LDS Church subsidizes and oversees the operation of Ricks College, now BYU-I. Olsen
and his coworkers’ actions demonstrated this impetus experienced by members of the
LDS Church to quickly assume leadership roles as the disaster unfolded.
When the flood proved more devastating to the areas below the college than
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anyone could have expected, Olsen started assigning people dorm rooms for the night.
Those who did not stay in the dorms found temporary shelter with other families in the
area whose homes escaped the water or with relatives not far from the floodplain. Some
people took in as many as seven other families. Nearly seventeen hundred people spent
Saturday night in the dorms or in someone else’s home.93
Pat Price, the director of foodservices at Ricks, immediately went into action
filling pots with water in the event that Ricks lost its water supply. He and his crew then
started making soup for dinner that night. Price and his wife stayed up all night preparing
soup for the victims and arranging breakfast for the following morning.94 While Price
and his wife worked around the clock to ensure enough food for everyone who showed
up to the Manwaring Center, they missed their only opportunity to salvage any personal
belongings or ascertain the flood damage to their own home.95 Price and his wife, both
members of the LDS Church, prioritized the welfare of others above their own needs,
harkening back to the communal aspects characteristic of Mormonism from its earliest
days.
Just hours into the disaster, unique problems began to emerge among the flood
victims at the Manwaring Center. Many families with babies and young children sought
shelter at Ricks and did not bring enough diapers or baby formula to even make it
through the night. Ricks College contacted Max Call, a member of an Idaho Falls stake
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presidency and informed him that they needed diapers and formula quickly. Call and
several members of his ward bought all the baby supplies they could find in Idaho Falls,
loaded them in a truck and delivered them by Saturday night. Some babies required
goat’s milk and a quart showed-up anonymously Saturday night along with two goats that
they continued to milk in the days to come.96
After trying to warn anyone he could reach, Ferron Sonderegger, a Rexburg-area
stake president and professor and football coach at Ricks, made his way to the college
and tried to locate other area Stake Presidents Keith Peterson and Mark Ricks. He then
quickly worked to activate the priesthood leadership of the church following the line of
authority characteristic of the Mormon Church in any circumstance. When he could not
find them, President Sonderegger went to his office at Ricks and tried calling the LDS
Presiding Bishop Victor Brown at church headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah.97
Because it was Saturday Bishop Brown was not in, but Sonderegger made contact with
someone in the office and told him of the dire situation developing in eastern Idaho.
Finally, Quinn Gardner made contact with Sonderegger; he had previously worked on
church welfare efforts during a Guatemalan disaster. Gardner asked Sonderegger to
report to him every hour in order to stay apprised of the evolving situation. Gardner also
asked what Sonderegger thought the flood victims needed immediately. They agreed that
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blankets and food would address any urgent concerns in the Rexburg area.98
Saturday night, several hours after President Sonderegger’s first call, a truck from
the LDS Church Welfare System made it into Rexburg and unloaded its contents at the
Manwaring Center. Those who took advantage of the dorm rooms at Ricks that night
enjoyed clean bedding to cover the bare mattresses in their rooms. The welfare system
also provided coats and other clothes to those who only possessed what they were
wearing when they escaped the flood. The first truck did not contain enough supplies for
everyone in need that night, but truck after truck followed in a constant stream to bring
much needed supplies to the displaced population in the disaster area.99
Most people went to sleep Saturday night in dry clothes, fed, and in some type of
shelter. Friends and neighbors, the Red Cross, local church leadership, or the central
church welfare system had met their immediate needs. Nevertheless, Nola Vance of
Sugar City, who wrote a memoir of her flood experiences entitled Safe in a Hayfield:
Overcoming the Challenges of the Teton Dam Disaster, remembered the despair she
experienced as she reflected on the sacrifice and work she and her husband had invested
to make their farm productive. That evening she wondered, “What did our property look
like now? […] How will this tragedy impact my life?”100 Not alone with her anger,
despair, and disbelief, Vance echoed what many of the flood victims struggled within the
darkness of that Saturday night and faced at the dawn of Sunday morning.
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For Vance and others, the announcement of a conference with Stake Presidents
Sonderegger, Ricks, and Peterson in the Hart Auditorium at Ricks brought hope. The
gathered assembly sang the LDS hymn “Come, Come Ye Saints,” written by William
Clayton to commemorate the sufferings and achievements of the early Mormon pioneers
who left their settlement in Nauvoo to escape persecution and find a peaceful home in the
West. Vance took comfort in phrases found in the second verse:
Why should we think to earn a great reward,
If we now shun the fight?
Gird up your loins, fresh courage take,
Our God will never us forsake;
And soon we’ll have this tale to tell—
All is well! All is well!101
The speakers at the conference urged their listeners to work, rebuild, and record their
spiritual, humorous, and miraculous experiences in the coming weeks and months.
Speakers also encouraged the assembly to start cleaning up their homes and communities
and not wait for government assistance. President Sonderegger had contacted the LDS
Church headquarters and it knew of the circumstances of the people in the Upper Snake
River Valley. Vance reported that the morale of the audience received a boost when they
knew the church had assured its help.102 Members of the Mormon Church believed
strongly that their doctrines of self-reliance and independence would successfully guide
them through this tragedy. They willingly put their faith in the church rather than the
federal government.
Before the dam even broke the local organizational system of the LDS church
went into action to address the emerging disaster situation. This Mormon community
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activated several levels of church leadership to meet the needs of the flood victims. Max
Call, a local priesthood leader, organized other priesthood holders to bring needed
supplies into Rexburg. Stake presidents and bishops in the area telephoned warnings to
those in their stakes and wards, and after the waters receded checked to make sure
everyone in their jurisdiction (members or not) had a place to stay Saturday night.
President Sonderegger initiated communication with the main welfare system of the
church, which had previous experience in aiding disaster victims, and brought supplies
only hours after the breach of the dam. The LDS-owned and affiliated Ricks College put
its entire campus at the disposal of flood victims and later the private and governmental
agencies that would come to help in the ensuing recovery period.
The victims of the Teton Dam disaster had no idea what the future held for them.
Many did not even know if their houses had survived that Saturday night. Yet, all of the
available resources of their local church and its leadership reassured the Mormons of
eastern Idaho that night. The attitude of wariness toward the federal government and
outside agencies espoused by the church for over a century continued to influence
members in the summer of 1976. Mormons in eastern Idaho placed unwavering faith and
trust in the full support of LDS Church headquarters to assist them on their road to
physical and spiritual recovery.
Having the full support of the church during the recovery process not only
provided victims of the flood with a sense of security, but they also sensed an opportunity
to demonstrate to their non-member neighbors, outside agencies, and the nation the value
of their welfare system and priesthood organization. President Sonderegger reminded
Bruce Blumell in an interview shortly following the disaster “we should never overlook
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the non-members who have been in here. This has been a great fellowshipping
opportunity.”103 Church leaders perceived that the disaster provided an invaluable
opportunity to put Mormonism in a positive light. The Sunday meeting also showed to
members that the church would direct the terms of the recovery process. They would
make no changes to how the hierarchy of the priesthood functioned and would play the
traditional role of the federal government by being the primary agency in organizing all
facets of post-disaster restoration. This approach added a new chapter to the typical
American disaster response and a perceived shift in the history of Mormonism in
America.
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CHAPTER 4: MORMONISM IN TRANSITION
Despite the amount of property damaged and the vast portion of land affected by
the collapse of the Teton Dam, this disaster has received very little treatment beyond
minor analysis in larger works about the Bureau of Reclamation, western water
management, or general accounts of Mormon history. The minimal loss of life may lead
many historians to misjudge the magnitude of this disaster and prevent further
investigation. In David L. Crowder’s work, Rexburg, Idaho: The First One Hundred
Years, 1883-1983, the 1976 dam failure received only slight mention with the author
giving a passing account of the dam failure and recovery effort.104 Other works, such as
Dylan J. McDonald’s The Teton Dam Disaster, provide an excellent description of the
events of June 5, but do not offer any type of historical analysis. The Ricks College Press
produced That Day in June: Reflections on the Teton Dam Disaster, a compilation of
experiences by those in the affected area from the oral history interviews conducted by
historians from Ricks College, Utah State University, and the LDS Church. That Day in
June relies on the impressions of victims without providing much analysis.
Historical examination of the Teton Dam failure may be limited, but the oral
history interviews held in BYU Idaho’s Special Collections provide myriad perspectives
on the causes of the failure, of attempts to flee the rampaging waters, about the early days
of the recovery, and on the long-term issues that survivors faced following the disaster.
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Local residents provided most of the oral histories and many of these residents claimed
membership in the church. Bruce D. Blumell, the official LDS Church Historian in 1976,
also conducted a series of interviews for the church, mostly of priesthood leaders at
various levels (i.e. stake presidencies or bishoprics). In addition to church leaders, he
included the representatives of several government agencies sent to the Rexburg area.
The analysis here relies largely on these oral history interviews to describe the unique
Mormon perspective of this event and on the perception of those outside the church and
their response to a largely Mormon community.
Marc Reisner, Donald Worster, Wayne J. Graham, and Michael C. Robinson offer
insightful analyses about the significance of the Teton Dam disaster and what it meant to
the history of the Bureau of Reclamation in their respective works. Robinson and
Graham’s examinations of the disaster are more sensitive toward the Bureau. Robinson’s
argument in Water for the West: The Bureau of Reclamation, 1902-1977, asserted that the
responsibility of the dam failure rested with the Bureau, but this event led to
improvements in oversight on their future projects. Robinson referred to the era
following Teton as “reclamation in transition,” admitting that the credibility of the
Bureau had suffered. The Bureau had learned from Teton, Robinson asserted, and the
vast changes the Bureau had implemented in the western United States improved the land
making it more habitable through irrigation projects.105
Wayne J. Graham echoed Robinson’s cautiously upbeat tone in his paper “The
Teton Dam Failure-An Effective Warning and Evacuation,” presented at the Association
of State Dam Safety Officials 2008 conference. Graham supported findings that held the
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Bureau’s design of the dam at fault for its failure. Nevertheless, he chose to focus his
analysis on the timely recognition by the Bureau that their dam was in imminent danger
of collapsing, which allowed for an effective evacuation and minimized the loss of life.
Even when admitting that the Bureau violated its own policy for filling the dam, Graham
still praised the team on site for frequently monitoring the area for any sign that the
rapidly filling reservoir could jeopardize the structural integrity of the dam.106
Marc Reisner provided one of the most compelling and scathing accounts of the
failure of the Teton Dam in Cadillac Desert. For Reisner, Teton signaled the end to a
heyday of Bureau dam building. His research revealed that dam sites had become more
questionable, but with the Bureau’s impeccable reputation, not many people involved in
these projects questioned their decision-making.107 Reisner condemned the Bureau for
the silence it maintained after the failure of Teton, remarking that no Bureau employees
lost their jobs in the wake of four different investigations into the collapse of the dam.
Idaho politicians, Mormons, and western water users also faced Reisner’s acerbic
assessment of their desire to rebuild the Teton Dam at its original site. The Bureau and
its supporters, according to Reisner, had no understanding about the environmental limits
of the area or ability of technology to overcome these limits.108
Donald Worster, in his work Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of
the American West, devoted less analysis on the meaning of the Teton Dam failure than
Reisner, but essentially agreed with Reisner’s denunciation of water-hungry westerners.
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“A tragedy like Teton Dam could give no one satisfaction, but it could usefully suggest
that the hydraulic society had a misplaced, dangerous confidence in its mastery, through
concrete, steel, and earth, over nature.”109 Worster viewed Teton as a warning, convinced
that the hubris of the Bureau, other dam building agencies, and western states would
easily permit another tragedy to happen in their pursuit of greater control over natural
resources.
Several historians studying this disaster have looked at the unique religious
perspective on the dam failure through the lens of Mormon doctrines. Not many of the
LDS residents in the area experienced any sort of premonition or foreboding that the dam
would collapse, but numerous members of the church believed that miracles and spiritual
lessons followed the receding floodwaters. Kent Marlor, the Operations Director of Civil
Defense and church member, believed that the flood taught victims humility and fostered
a desire among church members to better prepare themselves for future disasters and
difficult situations.110 Most members of the church believed that the timing of the
disaster showed divine intervention. President of the LDS Church at the time of the
disaster, Spencer W. Kimball, maintained that the flood occurring in the middle of the
day showed divine mercy and gratefully declared, “thanks has been to our Heavenly
Father that we have come out of it in large measure without the loss of lives.”111 Most
Mormons supported the idea that the dam failed due to human error rather than divine
punishment. Dale Nicholls, interviewed following the flood, believed that they were “not
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being punished for anything, that is not why the dam collapsed.” He believed that if “we
lived right and do the things that we are supposed to, as far as the church goes, it would
be a blessing to us.”112 For LDS members residing in the Upper Snake River Valley, this
disaster signaled an opportunity to make positive changes in their lives. Other church
members supposed God allowed for this disaster to serve as a warning to vigilantly
prepare both spiritually and temporally for future trials of faith similar to the Teton Dam
disaster.
Brent Kinghorn, an administrator at Ricks, outlined several lessons he learned
from the recovery effort, shared by many other Mormons in the area, such as a need for
increased humility, greater attention to family, the importance of supporting the
community, and a reaffirmation of the goodness of humanity.113 The oral histories of this
disaster reveal these central themes as the narratives that dominated LDS residents’
understanding of this catastrophic event. Mormon leaders and members wanted this
tragedy to be a triumph in order to encourage a positive perception of the church by its
own members and those not of their faith.
While many historians have used Teton to criticize the Bureau or western water
usage, scholars of Mormon history have used this disaster for starkly different purposes.
In addition to the influence of Mormon theology on perceptions of the disaster, Mormon
historians Leonard J. Arrington, Davis Bitton, F. Ross Peterson, and Bruce D. Blumell
have analyzed the evacuation, emergency, and recovery phases of this disaster to reveal
the role the LDS Church played during and following the disaster. These historians

112

Dale Darnell Nicholls, box 7, folder 30, page 7, MSSI 2, BYUISC.

113

Brent Kinghorn, box 7, folder 12, pages 22-23, MSSI 2, BYUISC.

50
declared it a story of success for the Mormon Church. All four generally agreed that
despite the extensive damage to property and the local landscape, the Teton Dam failure
provided an opportunity for the LDS Church to promote a positive image of its welfare
system and leadership organization to members and those organizations and leaders
outside the church.
Arrington and Bitton supported this positive view of easy cooperation between
the Mormon Church members and the government. The Mormon Experience portrays the
charity and self-sufficiency of the Mormons with regard to making the work of the
federal agencies more efficient and effective following the disaster.114 F. Ross Peterson
defended this perspective in his address presented at the 1982 Utah State University
Annual Faculty Honor Lecture entitled “The Teton Dam Disaster: Tragedy or Triumph?”
Peterson acknowledged the tragedy of those who died in the flood and the catastrophic
level of damage to property and the environment, but also concluded that the dam failure
resulted in a triumph of “volunteerism, government, and religion [in which] a sense of
community was maintained.”115 Peterson’s conclusions differ vastly from those of
Reisner or Worster, who saw the dam failure as a blight on human history. Peterson
blatantly disagreed with this position and finished his lecture claiming, “The Teton Dam
story […] will contribute to the glory of our past.”
Using the thirty-eight interviews he conducted in 1976, Blumell analyzed how a
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largely LDS community responded to a disaster of this magnitude.116 He concluded that
the Mormon community lengthened the amount of time that people typically behaved
altruistically following a disaster due to their emphasis on the welfare of the community
over the individual. He also echoed the prevailing opinion among church members that
Teton provided an opportunity for the church to test its welfare system. Blumell found
several areas where the church could improve its disaster response approach, from
acquiring a helicopter to including the Relief Society (a women’s organization within the
church) more in exclusively addressing the needs of disaster victims.117 Blumell found
some obvious shortcomings in the LDS response, but gave measured praise to the church
for its successful handling of the Teton Dam disaster.
Previous historians who have addressed this disaster have affirmed the desire of
the church to prove to members and nonmembers that it could effectively work with
outside agencies and comprehensively support its own membership. Elder Melvin J.
Ballard of the First Presidency in 1949 explained that one of the roles of the church’s
welfare system was to gain a positive outside response. Speaking of another disaster,
Ballard claimed, “The Church rose magnificently to the great emergency and put into
operation a welfare program which at once attracted the attention and favorable comment
of the entire nation. Nothing else has ever brought to this Church so much favorable
publicity as has this program.”118 The church has used the positive aspects of this
disaster response in a narrative of cooperation, self-reliance, and a new level of
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accommodation not known in the nineteenth century church. This narrative, while
somewhat accurate, glosses over the reality of Arrington’s hypothesis relating to this
disaster, that the changes were only superficial. The church did work with government
agencies, but many times dictated the terms, used the priesthood to carry out secular
tasks, and mediated most of the interactions between local members and government
programs. The church intended to change nothing, save its image, and protect itself and
members from government and outside influences.
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CHAPTER 5: MAINTAINING THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND INDPENDENCE OF
THE LDS CHURCH AND ITS MEMBERS
Despite having almost no warning about the impending disaster and no notion of
the scope of the tragedy, the LDS Church, Red Cross, and local and federal government
agencies responded quickly to the Teton Dam flood. During what sociologist Allen H.
Burton terms the “emergency phase” of the disaster in his work Communities in Disaster:
A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations, the LDS community in the
Rexburg area pulled together, following the Mormon tendency to work in a close
community.119 When other agencies arrived to respond to the disaster they found
themselves confronted with a unique cultural situation. The historical relationship
between the LDS Church and government institutions had been tense, leading both sides
to proceed with caution when aiding victims of the disaster. Working together during the
first two weeks following the disaster, church and secular leaders expressed their new
appreciation for each other’s efforts to rebuild the flood communities and support the
victims.
LDS Church Welfare Services had aided in several disasters before the Teton
Dam failure. It sent food, emergency supplies, and medicine to Chile in 1960 following
an earthquake and assisted flood victims in Utah, Idaho, and Nevada throughout the
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1960s.120 Their first comprehensive and noteworthy emergency response involved the
Teton Dam disaster, where they had to address the initial emergency phase and handle a
long-term recovery period with a high percentage of affected church members. The
church succeeded in securing praise for its work in eastern Idaho. Yet, a closer
examination reveals only superficial accommodation of other parties involved in the
recovery effort and a difficulty of members and church leaders in forsaking deeply
entrenched Mormon beliefs and practices. The tendency to value community above
individual welfare, the importance of self-reliance rather than taking a perceived
“handout,” and the church’s dominant role in influencing the lives of its members
demonstrated an adherence to the original doctrinal principles of the church.
Relying too much on government aid and outside support by Mormons during the
Great Depression led Heber J. Grant, then president of the church, to announce the
organization of the Church Security Plan (later referred to as the Welfare Plan or System)
during an April 1936 general meeting of the church membership. He intended this
organization to combat dependence among the members on federal relief and aid
programs introduced in the 1930s. One of the responsibilities of the church, according to
Grant, involved taking care of the temporal needs of its members. Tithing and fast
offering donations would finance this welfare plan where local wards and stakes would
assist local members first and then send any surplus to church headquarters where it
could distribute it to other areas in need.121 The foundation of the program rested on
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explicitly providing opportunities for the jobless to work, not only to help them earn an
income, but to protect their sense of self-worth in the community.122
The Church Security Plan sought to help develop the spirituality of the members
of the church. The First Presidency agreed that addressing the temporal concerns of its
members provided the best method to bolster spiritual growth within the church. They
believed that the Security Plan allowed the Saints to preserve their independence and
self-respect by helping people help themselves. Above all, claimed the First Presidency,
“Our primary purpose was to set up, in so far as it might be possible, a system under
which the curse of idleness would be done away with [and] the evils of the dole be
abolished.”123
The church began construction in 1938 on a series of buildings to accommodate
its new welfare plan collectively referred to as Welfare Square. It built a root cellar,
cannery, a bishop’s storehouse (similar to a supermarket where those in need can shop
with a bishop’s order, an allowance that permitted them get necessities without paying
money), milk-processing plant, and grain elevator. Welfare Square produced all of its
own goods: food products, shoes and clothes, and furniture. To construct and staff
Welfare Square, the church employed members, providing more jobs to the Mormon
community.124 The willingness of members to embrace the new welfare plan by the
1960s greatly pleased church leaders, and they claimed that it had unified the church and
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increased spiritual growth from the top down.125 After successfully taking members
through the Depression, the welfare plan looked beyond its own community to aiding
victims of natural disasters and communities struggling with supplying basic needs
throughout the world.
The welfare plan successfully sustained members of the church both temporally
and spiritually by allowing them to address their own needs in a system devised by the
church. The hierarchy of the church also believed that they gained positive attention
from the welfare plan after decades of negative press, persecution, and struggles with the
local and federal governments. Leonard Arrington discussed the identity issues that
Mormons faced in the twentieth century, especially in adapting their church programs to
the evolving lives of its members. Arrington cited the welfare system as one of these
adjustments in Mormon culture that successfully helped bring the Mormon Church into a
constructive relationship with those within and outside the church.126
Church welfare supplies and personnel arrived the night of the Teton Dam
disaster and commenced in supporting the work that Ricks College did to help flood
victims. Stake presidents in the area primarily focused on keeping all of the various
agencies efficient and organized and provided a local connection to the flood victims.
This allowed church welfare system from Salt Lake City to direct its efforts to ensuring
all involved parties handled the recovery in a manner that agreed with church teachings
and doctrine. This also provided the welfare system with a major opportunity to
demonstrate on a larger stage its capabilities in an emergency scenario. The church used
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this prospect to foster positive interactions with non-members or critics of the church
through an effective and comprehensive disaster response program.
Richard “Dick” Barth, a member of the Church Disaster Committee and a
supervisor of bulk storage and commodities within the Bishop’s Storehouse System,
arrived in Rexburg Saturday night with the first welfare truck from Salt Lake. The
Church Disaster Committee formed shortly before or around an earthquake in Guatemala
early in 1976 its initial experience of providing relief in an emergency disaster
situation.127 The Teton Dam flood provided the first major test of the Church Disaster
Committee because of its proximity to Salt Lake and the uniquely high concentration of
Mormons in eastern Idaho.
Barth quickly realized that the scope of the disaster was unparalleled in terms of
property destruction. The welfare system began sending food and clothing from its
warehouses in the Salt Lake area. In accordance with Mormon welfare beliefs of
providing work for those seeking assistance, most of the labor involved with distributing
the items to those in need came from the local community. Too many volunteers quickly
became a problem for Barth, who did not have enough tasks for everyone to perform.128
During the first few days, those working with Barth to distribute food, clothing,
and other necessities did not completely conform to church welfare protocol and skipped
filling out Bishop’s orders allowing people to take what they needed for immediate
needs. Bishop’s orders are forms filled out by a bishop and ward members or families
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who require necessities from the Bishop’s storehouse. The bishop and individual
members decide together what items are essential and the bishop provides a signed form
of what they can obtain from the welfare system. After victims had their initial needs
met local church members and non-members alike used Bishop’s orders to obtain various
commodities from the welfare system.129
The church looked beyond the basic needs of its distressed members to address all
aspects of their lives. Members who had sons or daughters currently serving
proselytizing missions for the church temporarily lost their ability to financially support
their missionaries, so the welfare system stepped in to make the payments.130 The
welfare system assumed all transportation costs and provided all their own labor from
Welfare Square in Salt Lake City to the Manwaring Center at Ricks. Barth also included
in the total of church expenditures for this disaster any expenses that Ricks College
incurred over its normal operating costs.131
The church carefully tried to ensure that it addressed all the needs of its members,
however it also tried to help community members not of their faith. A bishop’s
responsibility lay within his ward boundaries and consisted of all people who lived in his
vicinity regardless of membership status within the church, including those with no
affiliation with the church at all. Nonmembers theoretically had the same access to
welfare commodities supplied by the church, the facilities and meals provided by Ricks,
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and the support system that members within the church enjoyed.132 Church members
understood that Christian principles inherent in Mormon doctrine compelled them to
make certain that their neighbors had their needs met regardless of their religious
affiliations. Providing for nonmembers also served the less altruistic purpose of
encouraging a positive view of church members, doctrines, and the welfare system.
The fear of government welfare programs that developed within Mormonism
from its beginnings and persisted into the 1970s quickly became an issue following the
dam failure. Governor Cecil Andrus visited eastern Idaho a week after the disaster,
touring the flooded areas and speaking to the people in a meeting with LDS Church
President Spencer W. Kimball. Governor Andrus sensed that people in this vicinity
struggled to accept aid from the government and other agencies. He spoke about this
issue with the president of Ricks College, Henry B. Eyring, following the meeting. He
told Eyring to explain to the LDS members in the area that the disaster presented a
special circumstance where the government owed the people. He also asked President
Eyring for a written explanation of the church’s official policy on welfare so that he
could inform the government agencies to conform to those standards. Eyring observed
that Governor Andrus recognized that the church lacked clarity in its guidelines
pertaining to government welfare and needed to quickly solidify its position.133 Andrus’
recommendations that government agencies conform to Mormon protocols demonstrated
his desire to accommodate the unique needs found in this region.
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Shortly after Governor Andrus’ remarks about Mormon reluctance to accept
government welfare, the church made clear its stance on welfare assistance from outside
the church in a June 15, 1976, letter to stake presidents and bishops in Idaho. It
reaffirmed their counsel that members should not accept any type of welfare not earned
through work. They continued with specific direction for those involved in the Teton
Dam disaster stating that the church anticipated that it could meet the immediate needs of
its members and “encouraged [members] to look to the Church rather than to other
sources for immediate relief of this kind.” The First Presidency did feel that accepting
loans, payments, or employment from the government was fitting in this situation,
leaving any specific situations to the discretion of the individual and possibly his or her
bishop. The final warning issued by President Kimball cautioned that dependence on
government welfare “is not only demoralizing but is unworthy of members of the
Church” and cited a scripture from the Mormon canonical work The Doctrine and
Covenants, 78:18, “Through my providence, notwithstanding the tribulation which shall
descend upon you,…the Church may stand independent.”134 The First Presidency’s
stance allowed for some outside welfare but in the same letter, they reinforced the caution
members exhibited toward the government and its welfare and public assistance
programs.
Those working with the Red Cross immediately noticed a difference in response
between previous disaster victims and the Mormon population of eastern Idaho. The Red
Cross established its main base of operations in Idaho Falls on Saturday night, and then
established relief centers in Rexburg and Roberts. Corry Tanner, a disaster coordinator
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for the Salt Lake City division, explained the role of the Red Cross generally and with
respect to the Teton Dam flood during a 1977 interview by Bruce Blumell. At the relief
centers flood victims received counseling about different types of aid available to help
them deal with their losses from the disaster. In Rexburg, Ricks College had addressed
most of the immediate housing and food needs, so the Red Cross worked to supplement
the efforts at the school.135 The Red Cross played a larger role in providing food in
Menan and Roberts, smaller towns that had a delayed response to the disaster when
floodwater three to four feet deep formed a lake rather than receding.136
In addition to providing meals and food for people in the flood plain, the Red
Cross assisted with clothing and other basic needs by providing comfort kits filled with
toiletries and disbursing orders that functioned like checks or cash at stores in the area
where victims could purchase necessities. The Red Cross paid merchants for disbursing
orders they fulfilled, believing that having new clothes rather than used items raises the
self-esteem of disaster victims. This system helped to financially support local
businesses that suffered from the disaster as well.137 Red Cross workers and volunteers
found that although many people living below the dam had only the clothes on their back,
they hesitated to take any type of aid from the Red Cross.
The First Presidency of the church had made it clear to members that they should
utilize the church welfare system first to fulfill their needs. Some members struggled to
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justify taking anything from a non-church agency, an issue that many Red Cross and
government workers from outside the area found surprising. The honesty of those
affected by the Teton Dam disaster also struck those who had participated in other relief
efforts where many people tried to secure more aid than they needed.138 Although the
Red Cross is not a government agency, workers sensed an undercurrent of wariness of
what victims perceived as any type of government involvement or assistance.139
Initially the workers in the Red Cross and government agencies from outside the
area supposed that the people involved in the Teton Dam disaster lacked gratitude for the
assistance they provided.140 Rexburg East Stake President Keith L. Peterson admitted
that in a meeting the day after the flood at Ricks, local church leadership had a rocky
beginning to their relationship with the Red Cross. Peterson declared that members in the
area had availed themselves of too much aid from the Red Cross. While Peterson stated
that many church members had contributed to the Red Cross in the past, justifying some
assistance from outside the church, he argued that “[the Red Cross] distributed too much
money here, and our people took too much money on clothing allowances and other
things. I think over a million dollars was the last figure I heard.”141 Even though many
Mormons in the area had actually donated to the Red Cross, some church leaders
maintained that members should not utilize the Red Cross as their primary source of
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relief. Local leaders followed the First Presidency’s directive regarding welfare and
reinforced the aloof, closed sense of community that dominated the early years of
Mormonism.
Notwithstanding the tenuous beginning between the LDS Church and the Red
Cross, both sides admitted that once communication improved, it fostered a greater
appreciation of each other’s contributions to the relief effort. Keith Peterson
acknowledged that the Red Cross could “do some things that the Church can’t do” and
that the church needed to learn how to interact with various other emergency relief
agencies in the future.142 Tanner attributed the Mormon hesitancy to accept aid to an
inability on the victims’ part to comprehend the magnitude of the disaster and the failure
of the church to indicate clearly its position on accepting welfare and other types of nonchurch aid. Ultimately Tanner believed that most of the Red Cross workers accepted the
unique situation presented by a largely Mormon population. He was even impressed
when people returned their unused disbursement orders either because there were
inadvertent duplications or they realized that their losses were not as bad as originally
thought.143 According to Tanner, the Red Cross eventually sensed that they had worked
successfully in this distinctive environment. Tanner’s interview also shows that despite
some improvement, the Mormon residents remained cautious of outside assistance and
their religious leaders sustained their attitude.
Even in situations where interactions between the local population and
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government agencies seemed to work smoothly, church leaders later regretted having to
rely on that agency at all. Temporary housing quickly became a top priority of the
recovery effort due to the massive loss of property and the federal government sent HUD
to address this need. Bruce Blumell interviewed Carlos Renteria, the director of
application assistance for the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) at the Teton Dam disaster, to understand the role of this agency and
its reception in a largely Mormon community. Renteria had represented HUD on
approximately fourteen disasters before his experience in Idaho in 1976 and explained to
Blumell how HUD operated in a typical disaster situation. Disaster victims whose homes
sustained enough damage to make them unlivable filed an application with HUD. An
inspector verified the level of damage; if it was severe, HUD made other housing
arrangements, mobile homes in this particular case. If the home sustained minor damage,
HUD assisted the homeowner in making minimal repairs, bringing the home to a livable
condition so that the homeowner could reside on the premises while continuing to restore
it.144
Without phones or people living at regular addresses, HUD found it difficult to
locate, communicate with, and assist victims in the disaster area. The organization of the
local LDS Church aided HUD in overcoming these setbacks. Stake presidents and
bishops had already met with the members of their wards and stakes and compiled a list
reporting their assessment of homes in their respective jurisdictions. Using this list, HUD
visited the homes before people even had to apply, accompanied by local church leaders
so that when applications did come in they had only to verify their findings on the list and
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could accelerate the process of getting individuals into a more stable living situation.
Renteria affirmed that HUD was “pretty lucky” with this particular situation and he
praised the LDS Church for being “so well organized.”145
HUD processed all eligible applications for some type of temporary housing in an
astounding sixty days. By December 1976, HUD had reduced its caseload by half with
only twelve hundred families or individuals continuing to rely on the organization for
their housing needs. The local HUD office director in Rexburg, Victor Gonzalez,
attributed this exceptional efficiency to “the assisted families in this area [who] have
exhibited a great deal of independence and self-sufficiency, and with their help we may
finish our job early.”146 The Mormon influence on the response went beyond the general
and local church leaders to the members who closely adhered to the LDS tenets of selfreliance and independence. The church leadership streamlined HUD’s process by
providing a vital pathway for quick communication between the agency and the people in
Rexburg while the victims and outside volunteers worked rapidly to restore any homes
that could be repaired quickly, freeing up HUD temporary properties.
A few minor instances of people becoming impatient with the HUD process
occurred, but residents below the Teton Dam expressed their pleasure with the work that
HUD did and the caliber of personnel who served them. The LDS Church also agreed
that its relationship with HUD had worked smoothly and provided excellent service to
flood victims. However, some local church leaders perceived that Mormon independence
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in a disaster could be increased in the future, eliminating the need for any aid from
outside agencies such as HUD. Stake President Howard Hillam of the Idaho Falls South
Stake declared that “we have had an opportunity to put the Church to a test, if you will,
so far as their abilities to help one another. I am totally convinced that the Church can do
whatever it wants, because of the great faith of the Saints.”147 While Renteria and HUD
generally found their involvement in a population dominated by Mormons successful, the
church leadership continued with caution to involve themselves with outside agencies.
Church leaders saw any loss of self-sufficiency by the church as a weakness that needed
rectification in the future.
While church leadership and many members struggled to accept any type of aid
from non-LDS or government organizations, they found government loans acceptable.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) moved into the Rexburg area to promote the
recovery of local businesses with government financial assistance. By paying off the
existing mortgage of the business and then providing a new thirty-year loan at an
affordable interest rate, a business affected by the disaster could literally start over. The
church readily supported aid of this type because leaders saw a distinction between loans
and “handouts” and used local priesthood to assist this agency as well.148 Although
people generally believed that the Bureau of Reclamation would have to make full
financial restitution, including paying off any SBA loans, the loans promoted a quicker
physical and economic recovery in the Upper Snake River Valley. Dan Ward, the
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Regional Director of SBA from Seattle, asserted that the church ultimately helped the
SBA and other agencies perform their duties in eastern Idaho. He stated, “Never before
in a disaster have federal agencies had access to so much volunteer help in providing
information, dispelling rumors, locating disaster victims, assisting with loss
documentation and inpediting [sic, expediting?] applications for financial help.”149
Although LDS Church policies and general sentiment from the leadership clearly
resisted attempts by outside organizations to provide material help to members in eastern
Idaho, the nature of the Teton Dam disaster required some accommodation by entrenched
sentiments of self-sufficiency. The process to determine what the government would do
financially for the victims began on June 8, 1976, when the Under Secretary of the
Interior D. Kent Frizzel established the Interior Teton Dam Failure Review Group (IRG)
to investigate the causes of the failure. The U.S. Department of the Interior and the State
of Idaho (Independent Panel) also commissioned an investigation into the contributing
factors of the failure of the Teton Dam. The IRG published its report in April of 1977,
and the Independent Panel’s report issued its report in January of 1977.150 Interim reports
shortly after the failure of the dam, issued on July 14, 1976, provided a hypothesis based
on initial tests at the dam site that the dam failed at a design level. The reliance on the
elaborate grouting curtain “inhibited adoption of other design features that could have
prevented the failure.” Ultimately the design of the dam proved inadequate for the
unique geological issues present in the Teton Canyon.151 Because both panels attributed
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the failure of the dam to a faulty design rather than an earthquake or other natural
occurrence, they asserted that the Bureau of Reclamation and ultimately the federal
government must bear financial responsibility for the damage caused by the failure. In
1976, the Teton Dam failure was the worst dam disaster in terms of property damage in
history, with the bill estimated at one billion dollars in 1976.152
After the initial report, people began to realize that the federal government was
entirely at fault for the disaster and wondered when the government would reimburse the
victims for their losses. Some, like Stake President Keith Peterson, believed the
government would find any way it could to avoid financial responsibility for the
catastrophe.153 U.S. Senator from Idaho James A. McClure lobbied hard in Washington,
D.C. along with Representative George Hansen for full financial restitution for the Teton
Dam disaster victims. After declaring five Idaho counties disaster areas, President Gerald
Ford then asked Congress for legislation that would provide two hundred million dollars
to victims immediately. Ten days later, the federal government began to administer the
funds in eastern Idaho.154 Senator McClure knew that the initial payment would not
come close to covering the total losses in the Upper Snake River Valley.155 While the
initial reports by the federal government and the Bureau clearly indicated that they were
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responsible for the damage, President Ford never admitted any fault on the part of the
government. He stated, “No government has the power to eliminate tragedy from human
experience, but government can and government should act quickly to minimize the pain
of a great disaster and help to begin the healing process.”156
On September 7, 1976, President Ford signed the Teton Dam Bill; leaving the
amount of money the government would compensate the people open to allow a full
restitution for flood victims. President Mark G. Ricks of the Rexburg Stake maintained
that most eastern Idahoans changed their negative view of the federal government when
they sensed they had received more compensation than they had anticipated earlier in the
summer.157
Providing compensation in a highly concentrated Mormon population also
presented a unique set of issues. The nature of the disaster itself provided one of the first
instances with the reimbursement of disaster victims due to culpability of the federal
government. The head claims officer in Rexburg asserted that he believed as high as
ninety percent of the claims were legitimate with about ten percent considered
questionable.158 Many Mormons still expressed some reluctance in accepting this type of
money, despite being entitled to it under the circumstances. Stake President Keith
Peterson reported that many government claims workers conceded that many people did
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not request enough money to cover their losses. Peterson claimed that government
officials, early in the process, expressed concern that some of the older people had not
considered inflation and would not request enough money to replace the lost items at
their current price.159
Government officials may have agreed that the claims process proceeded honestly
with most errors bordering on claiming too little rather than too much; yet, in their own
communities, many Mormons articulated the concern in their oral history interviews that
their neighbors or people they knew had taken advantage of the reimbursement process.
These oral history interviews demonstrate the pervasive nature of this allegation, with
people hearing rumors about fraudulent claims, but not personally knowing of anyone
abusing the system. While Peterson expressed his opinion that there were a few
“outlandish claims,” most of the concern about these exaggerated losses was pure
supposition.160 Rumors of this nature revealed that many in these eastern Idaho LDS
communities feared that their neighbors might suppose they had relied too much on the
government or had not been completely honest. Mormons had more latitude in their
approach to their claims according to the First Presidency letter mentioned earlier, but
many members agonized about what they could justifiably claim and what would mean
too much reliance on money from the government. Many also critically judged their
neighbors’ claims by this standard.
The Teton Dam failure provided the LDS Church with its first major opportunity
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to test the emergency response aspect of its welfare program and justify its adherence to a
doctrine of self-reliance. Those inside and outside the church deemed the Mormon
welfare response a triumph. Church leadership and many members found less success in
navigating the offerings of other agencies sent to assist in the recovery effort. The
entrenched doctrine of self-sufficiency and the widespread wariness of the government
perpetuated by leaders to the general membership in eastern Idaho prevented Mormon
flood victims from fully utilizing assistance from government agencies. In some cases,
such as the Red Cross, this adherence to self-sufficiency caused friction between church
leaders and leaders of other organizations. On the surface, it looked as though the church
had moved forward in an effort to work amicably with government agencies according to
the vantage point of many church leaders. Looking at oral histories from both church
leaders and government officials demonstrates that church members actually maintained
their abhorrence of outside welfare efforts while the government and Red Cross altered
their approaches to promote a positive working relationship.
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CHAPTER 6: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN PRIESTHOOD AND CIVIL
LEADERSHIP
The leadership hierarchy of the LDS Church greatly influenced the recovery
process in eastern Idaho following the collapse of the Teton Dam. The church relies on
stake presidents and bishops or branch presidents for local leadership. The men ordained
to these positions have received no previous formal religious training and do not receive
financial compensation for their time or service. A bishop and his two counselors,
comprising a bishopric, oversee a congregation, referred to as a ward, that encompasses
around three to six hundred people.161 A stake, presided over by a stake president and his
two counselors, composed of five to twelve wards and is the intermediate unit of
organization between a ward and church headquarters.162 Bishops and stake presidents
derive their authority from the Mormon priesthood, “the power and authority by which
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is organized and directed.”163 The term
priesthood has several meanings in Mormonism, but in this analysis, it will denote the
local, male leadership of the church. The priesthood leaders in eastern Idaho performed
several tasks to streamline the recovery process such as communicating between local
members and church headquarters, mediating the relationship between members and
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government agencies, and keeping both church and outside groups organized and focused
on the recovery of the community. The role the priesthood played in several
circumstances following the disaster showed a desire to accommodate the government
agencies, but not at the price of losing primary access to church members and
relinquishing the independence of the overall church organization. The priesthood served
to maintain the close connection between local members and church headquarters. It
interceded, as much as possible, in interactions between members and outside agencies.
This relationship between members and priesthood leaders was another protective buffer
of the church’s overall independence.
The priesthood leaders in eastern Idaho quickly went into action to fulfill their
perceived immediate duty of ensuring that their neighbors had safely evacuated and that
they had notified church headquarters in Salt Lake of the disaster. President Sonderegger
of the Rexburg North Stake placed a call to the office overseeing the welfare system of
the church and called several times on June 5 to keep church headquarters updated on the
growing disaster.164 The night of the dam collapse, several stake presidents met with
bishops, their counselors, and other priesthood holders in wards to work on locating any
individuals or families who were missing. In this meeting the stake presidents announced
that they would follow the priesthood line of authority, meaning that if a bishop could not
be accounted for, the next priesthood holder in line would assume the bishop’s
responsibilities. Using this chain of command, they could quickly locate any victims that
remained unaccounted for and ensure that everyone within a ward had a place to stay for
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the night.165
On Sunday night, June 6, the church leaders in the area prepared to organize the
recovery effort that would allow them to rebuild their homes and towns.166 The county
commissioners (also members of the LDS Church) met with local stake presidents to
confirm that they would use the organization of the church to coordinate other local,
state, and federal programs once they arrived in Rexburg. On Monday morning, the
county commissioners held their first meeting in the Army Reserve building. These
meetings continued at the same time every day for several months until they tapered off
to a weekly and then monthly occurrence. Representatives from various government
agencies attended the meetings alongside local church leaders to determine what needed
to be done and which organization was the best equipped to handle it.167
The county commissioners agreed that any programs relating specifically to the
people involved in the flood should first go through the stake presidents. This division of
labor allowed the county commissioners to focus solely on repairing public facilities
while the church would assume responsibility for the people in the flood zone.168 Dell
Klingler, a county commissioner and member of the church, asserted that “if we as
commissioners would have had to set up the kind of organization that we had organized
in the Church, it would have taken months, and that would have been by far our biggest
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effort.”169 Klingler’s remark proved true; the priesthood organization streamlined the
recovery process for the victims by increasing the efficiency of the other involved
organizations. This initial decision by the county commissioners to rely so heavily on the
LDS Church, made before any government agencies arrived in eastern Idaho, also
demonstrated a desire to maintain the preexisting hierarchy. The stake presidents and
bishops would mediate most contact between the primarily Mormon flood victims and
the government programs sent to the area.
The federal government agencies attended their first correlation meeting on
Thursday June 8, in Idaho Falls. Mark G. Ricks, a local rancher and president of the
Rexburg Stake, attended on behalf of the church, where he met with representatives from
the Federal Disaster Assistance Agency (FDAA), HUD, and the SBA. The county
commissioners represented the local government at the meeting with Civil Defense
representing the State of Idaho.170
Ricks waited and listened to what the government representatives had to say and
then informed them that using the organization of the LDS Church would expedite their
efforts on this particular disaster. He also notified them that they had already initiated
recovery efforts and counseled the flood victims not to hesitate in beginning the cleanup
and repair process. Ricks described concisely how the welfare system of the church
functioned and explained, “the Church was organized and ready to reach people.” Ricks
recalled how many of the government representatives approached him after the meeting
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and expressed their interest and approval of utilizing the church organization to direct the
recovery efforts.171
The priesthood organization of the LDS Church essentially took on the traditional
role of the FDAA in coordinating the other federal programs. Hugh Fowler, a
representative of the FDAA explained this unique arrangement to Bruce Blumell in an
interview following the disaster. Blumell asked if Fowler knew of any problems between
the FDAA and the church’s ecclesiastical structure, and Fowler replied:
We’ve utilized them (local stake presidents) and gone to them quite heavily. I’ve
asked them if there were people living out in their wards or their stakes who are
non-LDS, and I’ve been assured that they were treated—and I’m sure this is
true—just the same as everybody else. I have no misgivings or anything. I am
just very, very grateful for the way they’ve handled it.172
Additional evidence to support Fowler’s assessment is difficult to find, but it
demonstrates that both Fowler and Blumell wanted this positive evaluation of the local
priesthood’s work during the recovery period to be true.
To maintain their own organization, the local stake presidents who worked with
government agencies also held daily meetings with the bishops in their stakes. These
stake presidents advised their bishops to hold daily meetings with the members of their
respective wards. The purpose of these meetings, according to President Sonderegger,
was to keep people informed and to dispel rumors. The bishops assured their
congregations that they could trust the accuracy of the information they provided, and if
they inadvertently gave false information, they would attempt to correct it
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immediately.173 Sonderegger believed that these meetings and the availability of
information despite a total breakdown in normal channels of communication helped
prevent widespread panic, psychological problems, or depression among the victims.174
President Ricks recalled how he thought these correlation meetings assisted the
government agencies in effectively meeting the needs of the victims. Referring to the
SBA, Ricks explained a typical conversation at one of the meetings: “Tell us what your
program is. We don’t know anything about it. We need to know so that we can pass the
information on to our people.”175 After the meeting, local priesthood leaders would
disseminate the details to their ward members. This method prevented inaccurate
information from spreading and gave flood victims a clear idea of the different avenues
of aid available from the federal government. It also reinforced the dependence of
members on their local priesthood leaders rather than government agencies.
HUD relied a great deal on the priesthood to address the housing issues in the
Rexburg area. Carlos Renteria described the problems that HUD faced in eastern Idaho,
particularly the inability to effectively communicate with the victims because the flood
had damaged the phone lines. By asking a bishop, HUD could easily find an individual
or notify them through the bishop that they needed to communicate with them. Bishops,
in many cases, had already compiled lists of people in their ward boundaries describing
the level of damage to their property, which greatly increased the efficiency of HUD’s
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operations in eastern Idaho.176 When HUD struggled to meet the needs of flood victims
in Sugar City, they used the local bishop as a liaison and actually allowed him to make
temporary housing assignments. The bishop assured Renteria that he would work with
all the victims in the area and not just those who belonged to the LDS Church.177
Using the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the church proved beneficial, but came with
unusual requests. The church did not intend to do any work on Sundays and asked the
other agencies to respect and comply with this custom. Many government agencies
completely shut down non-essential operations on Sunday to comply with this request.
Local church leaders and LDS welfare representative Richard Barth also informed the
agency issuing food stamps and the Red Cross that members would not avail themselves
of these “handouts.” While many people did take advantage of these programs, both
groups left the area on June 20 due to dwindling need by the victims.178
Even with the distinctive requests of the LDS Church and its membership, the
emergency phase of the recovery effort exceeded expectations from many agencies.
HUD believed that by using the organizational system of the church it finished its initial
housing evaluation six weeks sooner than in all previous disasters at which they had
worked. Other government agencies, according to Barth, also found that they could
easily exceed how many people they processed in a six-day workweek rather than their
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usual seven-day schedule.179 By using a preexisting system with people who already
trusted and knew each other, rather than leadership from outside the disaster area who do
not understand the distinctive nature of this particular community, agencies could work
more efficiently. Using local church leaders and volunteers also assisted these outside
agencies in their responsibilities.
The FDAA’s allowance of and the local priesthood’s insistence on coordinating
and dictating the terms of the relief effort following the collapse of the dam obviously
made the entire recovery process more efficient. Nevertheless, any type of compromise
between the LDS Church and the government agencies appears to arise from the federal
government rather than the church. The LDS members directly affected by the flood
soon moved on from a deep-seated undercurrent of state and federal government mistrust,
to an appreciation of the employees of various government agencies that assisted them
through the emergency phase of the disaster. Henry B. Eyring observed that the Mormon
conception of the “dirty government and […] the government and bureaucracy that have
to be watched” evolved because of the close contact between government agencies and
Mormons in the Rexburg area. Eyring asserted that he had “never seen as many
sensitive, competent, honest executives of business—as I’ve seen in HUD, and SBA, and
the Bureau of Reclamation in this whole situation. And the state people.”180
President Keith Peterson agreed with Eyring’s assessment that state and federal
government agencies treated the church and its members respectfully. Peterson believed
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that only a few minor incidents of misunderstanding occurred between the church and the
government, but they did not affect the overall sense of cooperation for the duration of
the disaster response. Feeling so strongly about the future attitude of church members
toward the government, Peterson shared his opinion: “You know, in the Church there are
a number of people who are consistently trying to teach us that the government’s bad and
that we shouldn’t participate with them and so on. And I think that’s a disservice to our
people.” He argued in favor of greater cooperation and asserted that “the government is
set up to serve our needs, we shouldn’t fear it or deprecate it. I think we need to use
it.”181 Peterson’s comment reveals the role the LDS Church occasionally played as a
barrier between its members and the government agencies. While the federal government
seemed to readily accommodate the unique situation presented by a large concentration
of Mormons, the church seemed reluctant to relinquish its influence on its members or
easily forget its long-standing tension with the federal government.
Relations between the government and the church seemed to remain helpful and
positive, but the church experienced some friction in its relationship with the Red Cross.
The church welfare system eagerly tried to meet every need of those affected by the
flood, but the welfare products and services provided and the benefits of the
organizational system came with certain requirements. Richard Barth personally made it
clear Sunday night following the dam failure that the church would organize the relief
effort. He told a Red Cross representative from Oregon that the Red Cross would not
perform its usual duties as the first organization on the scene with the power to make
decisions regarding how the recovery effort would proceed. Barth remarked in his oral
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history interview with Bruce Blumell that this Red Cross representative was upset,
“because he’d never run into an organization like the Church before. He just could not
comprehend what could be done. I guess he just assumed it would be chaos.”182
Eventually the relationship between the church and the Red Cross became amicable and
ran more smoothly after their initial encounter.
The biggest issue that arose between the church and the Red Cross had stemmed
from a lack of communication between the two agencies and between the church and its
members. Both organizations later agreed that an increased level of understanding would
salvage the relationship for upcoming disaster responses. Cory Tanner, the Red Cross
representative during the recovery period, discussed the efforts of the national
organization of the Red Cross and church headquarters to formalize their relationship
with the church and address any communication problems that arose during the Teton
Dam disaster. Like President Peterson, Tanner acknowledged that the church welfare
system had a lot to offer in terms of emergency relief situations and a formalized
agreement would increase their ability to cooperate in the future.183
Local priesthood leaders made several recommendations about how the
priesthood organization functioned on a local level. Most of the responsibility and work
resulting from the disaster response fell on the local stake presidents and bishops. Under
this level, the high priest group and elder’s quorum in each ward should have received
assignments from their bishops to assist him with his duties. Below the quorum level, the

182

Richard Barth, interviewed by Bruce Blumell, November 2, 1976, box 2, vol. 2, page
40, MSSI 2, BYUISC.
183

S. Corry Tanner, interviewed by Bruce Blumell, March 30, 1977, box 2, vol. 3, page
165, MSSI 2, BYUISC.

82
most basic priesthood assignment in the church is the home teaching responsibility,
where leaders assign a priesthood holder several families in his ward to visit each month
and assist in any type of emergency. The home teaching network provides the most
direct communication between ward members and the church.184 President Peterson and
other local leaders argued that in the Teton Dam disaster the basic priesthood
organizations initially failed to support the bishop or stake president in his duties.
Peterson emphasized, “If a man has a priesthood stewardship and a priesthood
responsibility, he can’t get too busy with his own affairs. He’s got to function […] we
had a lot of priesthood leaders who got so concerned with their own affairs that they
didn’t function very well.”185 When quorums and priesthood holders in wards failed to
prioritize the welfare of the group over their individual needs, Peterson asserted that these
men had neglected church teachings regarding priesthood stewardships. Peterson’s
comment demonstrated, that despite an initial breakdown in the hierarchy he still adhered
to the church principle and practice of placing the welfare of the group over that of the
individual.
President Mark Ricks recalled that the bishops in the area became so burdened by
the day-to-day problems in their wards that their own homes and properties became
neglected. The wives and families of these bishops expressed dismay because the bishop
had to spend all of his time with ward members and had no time for them. Ricks
contended that the bishops needed to delegate more to the quorums in their wards. They,
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in turn, needed to fulfill their assignments, which would have spread the responsibilities
out, allowing everyone in the ward to have some time to address their personal
obligations. A lack of communication and no prior precedent for a disaster of this nature
within the church, Ricks believed, contributed to less mobilization by lower priesthood
positions.186 In a later interview with Blumell, Ricks stated that the lower echelons of the
priesthood started functioning according to standard church protocol at the end of July,
when most of the chaos had subsided.187
The Relief Society, a women’s organization within the church that emphasizes
service, became somewhat neglected by local priesthood leaders in the area. General
Relief Society President Barbara Smith reported to Bruce Blumell several volunteer
projects that the Relief Society initiated in the Rexburg area. Local Relief Societies
arranged to feed people several meals a day from chapel kitchens. They also started a
nursery program where several women would watch children during the day at Ricks
College while their parents worked to clean up their homes.188 Despite the amount of
work they did in the community to address the needs of the victims, local priesthood
leaders failed to include Relief Society presidents in daily meetings. Local Relief
Societies also did not have clear expectations regarding what their role during the disaster
should be. Blumell, in his article “The LDS Response to the Teton Dam Disaster in
Idaho,” attributed this disregard for the Relief Societies in the area to the aforementioned
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problems with communication. Despite little direction from their priesthood leaders,
most Relief Societies organized themselves to tackle any disaster-related issues within
their ward boundaries.189 While the Relief Society organization does not necessarily
need direction from the priesthood, it does need some of its actions sanctioned by an
overseeing priesthood leader. Although the local Relief Societies did not get the
opportunity to attend the correlation meetings, they provided many types of service to aid
flood victims in the summer of 1976.
The local priesthood leaders functioned remarkably well considering the
catastrophic level of damage inflicted by the Teton Dam failure. Those with official
leadership positions such as bishops or stake presidents carried out their duties as
proscribed by their respective office. Priesthood holders in the levels of responsibility
below a bishop struggled to fulfill their obligations with the same attention as the bishops
or stake presidents due to a lack of communication within the ward or stake or the
severity of their own situation following the flood. Most local priesthood leaders also
neglected to fully utilize the Relief Society, and excluded female members of the LDS
Church in leadership positions from actively participating in the decision-making process
of the recovery effort.
In spite of the shortcomings many church leaders perceived in their own response
to the disaster, some, like Henry B. Eyring, saw the larger situation as “a great moment in
Church History.” He gave “high marks” to Presidents Ricks, Peterson, and Sonderegger
and other leaders for quickly adapting to the situation and to the people of the Upper
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Snake River Valley for their heroism.190 The new disaster manual produced by the
church following the flood had input from the Relief Society and all the priesthood
quorums involved and addressed LDS disaster response on a personal, ward, stake, and
church-wide level.191 Because of their efficiency, Eyring believed that government
agencies would emulate some of the church methods of disaster response and rely more
on the church in the future. Eyring believed that from this experience, the next time an
agency responded anywhere around the country they would say, “Where are the
Mormons?”192
Many of the local leaders, according to oral history accounts, saw the perception
of the church by government organizations and outside agencies change during their
interactions throughout the summer months of 1976. Eyring recalled an experience
where the Idaho Statesman in Boise had raised fifty thousand dollars for the disaster
victims, and rather than give it to the Red Cross to distribute, they chose Eyring and
Ricks College to select people to receive the Statesman money. Eyring considered the
circumstance of a “historically anti-Mormon newspaper” trusting an LDS college to be a
sign that the Teton Dam failure successfully improved the relationship between
Mormons, state and federal government agencies, and other secular organizations.193 The
church looked to its welfare program to encourage a positive opinion of its practices and
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teachings and secured this praise for their work with the Teton Dam. They also received
positive feedback from the government representatives sent to eastern Idaho for their
organizational structure led by local priesthood leaders.
The reaction by priesthood leaders to laudatory press and comments they thought
the church received for their efforts during the disaster recovery showed an attempt by
the church to actively seek greater acceptance in the U.S. of their unique way of doing
things. The church focused on improving relations with other agencies as well as
government organizations to promote the idea of a new, more cooperative LDS Church.
While they believed themselves successful in securing a better image for the church, they
also managed to maintain their unique principles and practices. Local priesthood leaders
monopolized the avenues of communication between government agencies and the flood
victims. The cooperation and compromise came mostly from the government agencies
and organizations outside the church who allowed the priesthood leaders to coordinate
their efforts and dictate to their wards and stakes what types of government or Red Cross
assistance would be acceptable to receive. Any outside acceptance of Mormon welfare
and organizational systems came without altering their methods or beliefs. Most of the
accommodation arose from the government agencies or Red Cross who found themselves
in the minority for the duration of this disaster.
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CHAPTER 7: ORGANIZING AN ARMY OF VOLUNTEERS
In addition to coordinating with government agencies, local priesthood leaders
also organized their own volunteer effort to assist homeowners in the flood zone to clean
the mud and debris from their homes and properties. The ability of the victims to quickly
repair and restore their homes resulted from thousands of volunteers from Idaho, Utah,
Wyoming, and Canada who worked in various capacities to restore the flood-ravaged
homes in the Upper Snake River Valley. The stake presidents in the area took control of
the volunteer labor to maximize the work done, ensuring that electricians and other
skilled workers were sent to the correct areas, the proper amount of workers were
assigned to a home, and that the necessary tools and equipment were available. The
organization of volunteer labor by local priesthood leaders demonstrated the communal
spirit typical of the early LDS Church, and the church used this effort to generate a better
image of the church.
With supplies and money flooding into the disaster zone, only the copious
amounts of mud and debris hindered the recovery process. Janet Hibbert of Sugar City
recalled the daunting task she and her husband Larry had before them with mud reaching
the bottom of their basement windows, approximately four feet deep. Hibbert expressed
despair as she viewed the task in front of her, “It seemed impossible, and I surely felt like
an ant with such a big undertaking ahead of me.” Soon after the flood, a group of
teenagers came to her home with “fishing waders, buckets, shovels, and gloves” and
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assisted the Hibberts in removing the mud from their basement.194 If homes had survived
the flood and remained mostly intact on their foundations, mud and all manner of debris
filled their structures. Any type of recovery endeavor had to address the need for a
substantial volunteer effort to eradicate the mud, garbage, and wreckage from people’s
homes, farms, and businesses.
President Sonderegger suggested to other stake presidents in the affected region
that stake presidents who escaped the flood each take one of the wards in the disaster
areas and assist with the recovery effort until completed. President Sonderegger trusted
his idea was the result of divine inspiration; an answer to his earnest prayers for help.
The church lacked a precedent for this type of assistance, causing some initial
disagreement between the priesthood leaders in the Rexburg area and those stake
presidents or bishops outside the area regarding how to organize such an effort.195 The
outside stakes originally contributed welfare items to the wards and stakes church
headquarters had assigned them to help. After they had taken care of the initial needs of
the ward, President Harold Hillam of the Idaho Falls South Stake, began organizing
crews of volunteer laborers to go into Rexburg, Sugar City, and other damaged cities to
start digging out the mud and debris about a week after the flood.196 In a correlation
meeting with the stake presidents, General Brooks of Civil Defense agreed that they
needed hundreds of man-hours just for the clean-up process (a bishop in Sugar City
estimated that an average house in his ward required around four hundred hours to merely
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remove the mud and clean the house).197 For a week, President Hillam had around three
thousand volunteers a day arriving in buses from surrounding areas in Idaho, Utah, and
Wyoming to put in a full day’s work. On Saturday June 19, they had five thousand
volunteers, their biggest volunteer day during the recovery period of the disaster.198
Stake presidents within Rexburg decided on a daily basis how many volunteers
their stake needed and let President Hillam know. He then assigned stakes outside the
area to bring a certain number of volunteers or equipment and report to their location the
next day. In many cases, these stakes sent more laborers or machinery than President
Hillam requested. He had called several regional priesthood representatives (who
oversee several stakes in one region) to request front-end loaders, asking for five or six.
The regional representative in Soda Springs returned his call letting Hillam know that
they had located one hundred and fifty. The volunteers coming to the area also donated
more than just their work, according to Hillam. He explained to Blumell in an interview
how humbled the busloads of volunteers made him feel who “had been up since 3:30 and
4:00 a.m. to make that trip and come and spend a hard day’s work, furnishing their own
lunch, paying for their own transportation, and then getting back on the bus tired and
dirty and heading back home.”199
After the June 19 volunteer day, the clean-up efforts progressed rapidly,
necessitating specialized volunteers to help people make their homes livable. Working
with another stake president, President Yost, Hillam started bringing in electricians to
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restore power to individual homes. Hillam wanted around one hundred and fifty
electricians and Yost sent him between four and five hundred. Hillam instructed local
bishops to reimburse the electricians from their fast offering fund for any supplies they
used. Most of the electricians decided to forego the reimbursement, donating their time,
trucks, and supplies. This service alone saved many homeowners hundreds of dollars,
and a city electrical inspector stated that without this particular volunteer effort most
homes would have waited for months to have electricity restored.200
The bulk of the outside volunteer labor lasted around two weeks with people from
Idaho Falls donating around three hundred thousand man-hours during this period and
28,000 volunteers pouring in from surrounding areas, not including Idaho Falls.201 Hugh
Fowler, the deputy regional director of the FDAA, complimented the church and its
members throughout an oral history interview with Bruce Blumell. He maintained that
he had exceptional cooperation and patience from the people involved when compared to
other disasters he had encountered. Fowler also showed gratitude for the volunteer
program organized by the Church and expressed that, “it speeded things up
immensely.”202
While the FDAA and others were very complimentary toward the volunteer
efforts, many of the local church leaders, who were also grateful for outside help, argued
that they could have improved on the organizational aspects of their effort. President
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Sonderegger believed that the organizational system he initiated began to break down,
with too many volunteers and a lack of clear communication between the disaster area
and outside stakes assigned to help. Sonderegger stated that his original system of one
“helper” stake for each stake in the flood zone would have kept the system more
organized, but many other people believed that Rexburg needed an enormous amount of
volunteers from the region to deal with the great destruction in the area.203 Too many
volunteers may sound like an enviable problem in a disaster situation, but President
Hillam explained that the biggest concern with this specific issue was guaranteeing that
he did not waste the volunteers’ time due to poor organization.204
A monetary value cannot be assigned to the service that the outside volunteers
rendered in Rexburg, with Mormons and non-Mormons alike having their homes cleaned
out in a matter of weeks rather than months. Church members and leaders believed that
the volunteer work also benefited the image of the church in general and became another
tool for proselytizing and promoting good will toward church doctrine. President Hillam
judged that the volunteer effort put the LDS Church in a positive light. Many of the
volunteers not only brought their own lunches but a lunch for the people at whose home
they worked, and Hillam concluded this small act created a bond between many people.
He also recounted a story of volunteers from Pocatello who came to assist a man cleaning
out his home. The man told the volunteer that he was not a member of the church, and
one of the volunteers replied that it did not matter, they just wanted to help him. Hillam

203

Ferron W. Sonderegger interviewed by Bruce Blumell, July 6, 1976, box 2, vol. 1,
pages 55-57, MSSI 2, BYUISC.
204

Howard G. Hillam interviewed by Bruce Blumell, July 4, 1976, box 2, vol. 2, page 14,
MSSI 2, BYUISC.

92
described the volunteers “[looking] out on the porch there he was sitting in tears to think
the people would think that much to come and help him when he wasn’t a member of the
church.”205
Early in August, the volunteer efforts ended when more concrete information
about an impending monetary settlement from the government became available. The
church decided it could no longer accept free labor from volunteers if the government
agreed to make a full financial restitution to the victims.206 The organization of the
volunteer cleanup by the priesthood leadership in the area had served several purposes,
primarily giving flood victims a beneficial advantage in the recovery process. Kent
Marlor, the civil defense operations director in the area, claimed, “We are 400 percent
ahead of schedule” due to the volunteer effort.207 The LDS Church also claimed to
benefit from this massive organizational undertaking. One of their stated goals for their
welfare program was to garner positive attention for their service and values by those
outside the church. The Teton Dam disaster provided an opportunity to display their
efficient organizational system and comprehensive disaster response efforts to nonmembers.
In an interview with Bruce Blumell, HUD representative Carlos Renteria
commented on the volunteer effort sponsored by the church and praised their
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organizational system and desire to “help fellow humans.”208 Renteria’s interview with
Blumell reveals that he left Idaho with an overall positive impression of the LDS
Church’s approach to the disaster from the welfare system, priesthood organization, and
volunteer work. Hugh Fowler also made several appreciative remarks about working
with the stake presidents in the area and stressed that he relied on them “quite heavily.”209
Fowler, Renteria, and other disaster response workers noted the unique behavior of the
LDS disaster victims who exhibited more patience and altruism than these individuals
typically encountered in a disaster situation. They respected the local priesthood leaders
and the level of organization that was already in place in the flood zone, which
contributed to a quicker and more efficient recovery effort.
Dell Klinger, a counselor in a stake presidency and Madison County
Commissioner, expressed the belief of many in the church that the welfare program and
priesthood organization had positively influenced non-members from government
agencies and other disaster response organizations. He claimed in his interview with
Blumell, “these federal people are really amazed at the way the Church has organized,
and amazed at the spirit of the people.”210 Klingler also claimed that reporters from all
over the U.S. had visited the area and been impressed with how local leaders had handled
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this particular disaster.211 His interview with Blumell demonstrated that both he and
Blumell wanted it noted that those outside the church had praised and validated the work
of the church welfare system and local priesthood leaders. The actual articles referenced
by Klingler, particularly one printed in Time, does not actually mention the LDS Church,
yet Klingler and others maintained that they had the approving eyes of the nation upon
them.212
This perceived success by the church with its massive volunteer clean up,
priesthood leadership, and welfare products also convinced many priesthood leaders that
members and leaders within the church could have improved on this success. Stake
President Harold Hillam of Idaho Falls had been selected to coordinate the volunteer
efforts, with President Kimball eventually making it an official calling within the church.
Hillam, so confident of the work the church performed during this disaster, argued that
the church could perform the work that HUD or the Red Cross typically do in a future
emergency response situation. Hillam stated, “I am totally convinced that the Church can
do whatever it wants, because of the great faith of the Saints.” Hillam maintained that
while the Red Cross “did a great service. I think some of their services paralleled the
welfare services of the Church.” He then reaffirmed the church’s desire to remain
independent, arguing “We maybe would have been better off if we would have taken care
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of our own a little more with our welfare services.”213 While the stated purpose of the
LDS Church’s welfare system and priesthood organization was to promote charity based
on religious principles and positive exposure to non-members, many involved in the
Teton Dam disaster also saw it as an opportunity to see whether the church could
adequately respond to a disaster situation without having to rely too heavily on the
federal government or other organizations.
President Hillam believed that the volunteer effort in eastern Idaho showed that
the church had willing priesthood members who had a variety of practical skills. With
these assets, he believed the church could and should function independently of other
organizations, particularly the government. Many saw the Teton Dam recovery response
by the church as a preparatory effort to increase the independence of the church. The
desire of the LDS Church to use its welfare system and priesthood organization to
improve its image demonstrated a larger aspiration to achieve greater assimilation within
American society. Yet, these same LDS Church programs also served to maintain the
independence and self-sufficiency of the church from American society and government.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
President of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles Ezra Taft Benson toured the
flood-damaged areas of eastern Idaho on June 15, 1976. The Post-Register of Idaho Falls
recorded his impressions as he met with flood victims and viewed the destruction.
Speaking of the church’s welfare program and priesthood leadership, he observed that the
way it functioned in this situation “was an inspiration to me. I come away a better man.
It is pure religion in action. The Lord’s program is in full operation.”214 Benson
expressed his approval of the way local leaders handled things in eastern Idaho. “The
church is organized to help. The Lord expects the church to be a ‘light unto the world.’
Sometimes we have to have tragedy to rise and shine.”215 For The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, the collapse of the Teton Dam provided an opportunity to
demonstrate a new level of cooperation with the federal government and assimilation
within American society. While the exposure they believed they received for the amount
of work and resources they dedicated to help the people of eastern Idaho recover was
positive, most failed to note that the church had not truly changed its behavior. The LDS
leadership from the president of the church, Spencer W. Kimball, down to local bishops
in the area maintained a wariness toward outside welfare and assistance, continued to
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foster tightly-knit community ties, and relied heavily on the hierarchy of the priesthood to
organize much of the response and recovery efforts. The church and government
agencies worked well together, but this success is attributed to the accommodation of
Mormon principles and practices by the other relief agencies. The church had changed in
its desire for a positive perception by the government and American society only. Its
beliefs and practices remained intact from their nineteenth century roots.
Despite the catastrophic destruction of property caused by the Bureau of
Reclamation’s critical miscalculations, most eastern Idaho Mormons did not lose their
faith in dams or other western water projects. An article in the January 7, 1977 edition of
the Idaho Falls Post-Register claimed that many people supported the rebuilding of the
Teton Dam, including Reisner’s “crotchety Mormon farmer” Willis Walker.216 Walker
claimed, “We need that water, but if they build it next time, they should be sure they
know what they are doing.”217 Even residents who did not support the rebuilding of the
dam did not report complaints against the Bureau or express concern over pushing the
environmental limits of the Upper Snake River Valley.218 The Mormon attitude toward
the government, particularly the Bureau of Reclamation, remained similar to their pre1976 stance. LDS residents continued to support the investment of federal money in
large water projects as a way to facilitate their way of life in the arid West. They
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remained “dam Mormons,” wary of government welfare unless it supported the Mormon
community.
The environment proved to be another force that could not change the behavior of
the LDS Church, following attempts by the federal government and mainstream
American culture. Despite rampaging floodwaters and months of disarray in eastern
Idaho, the Mormon population clung to its historic principles of independence from
outside organizations, heavy involvement by priesthood leaders in member’s lives, and
the promotion of community welfare above the needs of the individual. The preexisting
organization provided by the priesthood, the massive volunteer effort, and the welfare
system of the church sped up the recovery process considerably and contributed to a
positive relationship between members and outside organizations. While HUD, FDAA,
SBA, and the Red Cross had to adapt their usual approach to accommodate a large
Mormon population, members and leaders of the LDS Church learned to respect and trust
agencies outside of their church community.
The church achieved its stated goal of becoming a “light unto the world” through
their welfare services employed during the Teton Dam disaster. Thomas S. Monson, a
member of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles since 1963 and, at the time of writing,
serving as the president of the LDS Church, participated in several national forums on
welfare and disaster response including President Ronald Reagan’s Task Force on Private
Sector Initiatives. In the course of this service, Monson frequently used the church’s
work during the Teton Dam recovery effort to illustrate the LDS approach to welfare
services and disaster response. Monson claimed that President Reagan praised the LDS
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welfare system for its emphasis on self-sufficiency.219
The LDS response to the Teton Dam collapse convinced some outside the church
that the LDS welfare system and priesthood organization could effectively manage a
disaster, but it confirmed the faith of many within the church that they could rely on this
organization. It convinced members that the principles of self-reliance, submission to
priesthood authority, and sacrificing individual needs for the good of the community
were still valid principles embraced by their chosen faith. The same principles and
beliefs that may have led to their support of the construction of the Teton Dam saw them
through the demise of this edifice. Speaking thirty-five years following the collapse of
the dam, Henry B. Eyring (now a member of the First Presidency of the church) recalled
his experiences in Rexburg in 1976 while serving as the President of Ricks College.
Eyring claimed, “what happened in the flooded houses in Idaho is a manifestation of the
Lord’s way to help those in great need become self-reliant.”220 The experiences
following the disaster in eastern Idaho became an integral piece in the seventy-six year
history of the LDS Church’s Welfare system and validated members’ beliefs that the
Mormon approach to addressing their temporal needs and concerns was as God would
have it.
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